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INTRODUCTION.

IN the Introduction to the first volume of the translation of the * Vedánta-Sütras with Sankara’s Commentary ' (vol. xxxiv of this Series) I have dwelt at some length on the interest which Rámánuga's Commentary may claim—as being, on the one hand, the fullest exposition of what may be called the Theistic Vedánta, and as supplying us, on the other, with means of penetrating to the true meaning of Bádaráyaza's Aphorisms. I do not wish to enter here into a fuller discussion of Rámánuga's work in either of these aspects; an.adequate treatment of them would, more- over, require considerably more space than is at my disposal. Some very useful material for the right under- standing of Rámánugas work is to be found in the ‘Analytical Outline of Contents’ which Messrs. M. Ran- gâkârya and M. B. Varadarága Aiyangár have prefixed to the first volume of their scholarly translation of the Sribhashya (Madras, 1899).

The question as to what the Sütras really teach is a critical, not a philosophical one. This distinction seems to have been imperfectly realised by several of those critics, writing in India, who have examined the views ex- pressed in my Introduction to the translation of Sankara's Commentary. A writer should not be taxed with ‘ philo- sophic incompetency, ‘hopeless theistic bias due to early training,’ and the like, simply because he, on the basis of a purely critical investigation, considers himself entitled to maintain that a certain ancient document sets forth one philosophical view rather than anothere I have nowhere expressed an opinion as to the comparative philosophical value of the systems of Sankara and Rámáànuga; not because I have no definite opinions on this point, but because to introduce them into a critical enquiry would

be purposeless if not objectionable. The question as to the true meaning of the Sütras is

~

ii INTRODUCTION. EE SE EEE no doubt of some interest; although the interest of problems of this kind may easily be over-estimated. Among the remarks of critics on my treatment of this problem I have found little of solid value. The main argu- ments which I have set forth, not so much ‘in favour of the adequacy of Ramanuga’s interpretation, as against the validity of Sankaravarya’s understanding of the Sitras, appear to me not to have been touched. I do not by any means consider the problem a hopeless one ; but its solution will not be advanced, in any direction, but by those who will be at the trouble of submitting the entire body of the Gütras to a new and detailed investigation, availing them- selves to the full of the help that is to be derived from the study of all the existing Commentaries.

The present translation of the Sribháshya claims to be faithful on the whole, although T must acknowledge that I have aimed rather at making it intelligible and, in a certain sense, readable than scrupulously accurate. If I had to rewrite it, I should feel inclined to go even further in the same direction. Indian Philosophy would, in my opinion, be more readily and widely appreciated than it is at present, if the translators of philosophical works had been somewhat more concerned to throw their versions into a form less strange and repellent to the western reader than literal renderings from technical Sanskrit must needs be in many passages. I am not unaware of the peculiar dangers of the plan now advocated—among which the most obvious is the temptation it offers to the translator of deviating from the text more widely than regard for clearness would absolutely require. And I am conscious of having failed in this respect in more than one instance. In other cases I have no doubt gone astray through an imperfect understanding ef the author's meaning. The fact is, that as yet the time has hardly come for fully adequate translations of comprehensive works of the type of the Sribháshya, the authors of which wrote with reference— in many cases tacit—to an immense and highly technical philosophical literature which is only just beginning to be studied, and comprehended in part, by European scholars.

A.

si o Er ERN — RP Ra. e e ee e EE LI

INTRODUCTION. iii S a 5 It gives me great pleasure to acknowledge the help’ which I have received from various quarters in preparing this translation. Pazdit Gangádhara Sástrin, C. I. E., of the Benares Sanskrit College, has, with unwearying kindness and patience, supplied me throughout with comments of his own on difficult sections of the text. Pazdit Svamin Rama Misra Sástrin has rendered me frequent assistance in the earlier portion of my task. And to Mr. A. Venis, the learned Principal of the Benares Sanskrit College, I am indebted for most instructive notes on some passages of a peculiarly technical and abstruse character. Nor can I conclude without expressing my sense of obligation to Colonel G. A. Jacob, whose invaluable ‘Concordance to the Principal Upanishads’ lightens to an incalculable degree the task of any scholar who is engaged in work bearing on the Vedanta.

CONTENTS.

VEDÂNTA-SÛTRAS WITH THE COMMENTARY OF RAMANUGA. - ^

INTRODUCTION

Apnuyiva I. Páda I

Páda II Páda III Páda IV

Apnváva Il. Páda I Pada II Pada III : uos : : 1 cue Pada IV c 2.29 2 2 REDE ApuyAya III. Páda I Páda II Páda III Páda IV

Apnuyáva IV. Páda I Páda II Pada III Pada IV

Inpexes BY Dr. M. WINTERNITZ :— .. Index of Quotations Index of Sanskrit Words . Index of Names and Subjects . Corrigenda

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@ Transliteration of Oriental Alphabets adopted for the Translations of the Sacred Books of the East .

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FIRST ADHYAYA. FIRST PÁDA.

MAY my mind be filed with devotion towards the highest Brahman, the abode of Lakshmi; who is luminously revealed in the Upanishads; who in Sport produces, sus- tains, and reabsorbs the entire Universe; whose only aim Is to foster the manifold classes of beings that humbly worship him.

The nectar of the teaching of Parásara's son (Vyása),— which was brought up from the middle of the mill-ocean of the Upanishads—which restores to life the souls whose vital strength had departed owing to the heat of the fire of transmigratory existence—which was well guarded by the teachers of old—which was obscured by the mutual.

conflict of manifold opinions,—may intelligent men daily

enjoy that as it is now presented to them ‘in my words.

The lengthy explanation (vzztti) of the Brahma-sütras- which was composed by the Reverend Bodháyana has been abridged by former teachers; according to their views the words of the Sütras will be explained in this. present work.

I. Then therefore the enquiry into Brahman.

In this Sütra the word ‘then’ expresses immediate sequence; the word ‘therefore’ intimates that what has taken place (viz. the study of the karmakázZa of the Veda) constitutes the reason (of the enquiry into Brahman). For the fact is that the enquiry into (lit. ‘the desire to know 5) Brahman—the fruit of which enquiry is infinite in nature - and permanent—follows immediately in the case of him

who, having tead the Veda together with its auxiliary

B2

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4 VEDÂNTA-SÛTRAS.

disciplines, has reached the knowledge that the fruit of mere works is limited and non-permanent, and hence has conceived the desire of final release.

The compound ‘brahmagigřâsâ’ is to be explained as ‘the enquiry of Brahman, the genitive case ‘of Brahman’ being understood to denote the object ; in agreement with the special rule as to the meaning of the genitive case, Panini II, 3,65. It might be said that even if we accepted the general meaning of the genitive case—which is that of connexion in general— Brahman $ position (in the above compound) as an object would be established by the circumstance that the ‘enquiry’ demands an object; but in agreement with the principle that the direct denota- tion of a word is to be preferred to a meaning inferred we take the genitive case ‘of Brahman’ as denoting the object. `

The word ‘Brahman’ denotes the highest Person (puru- shottama), who is essentially free from all imperfections and possesses numberless classes of auspicious qualities of unsurpassable excellence. The term ‘ Brahman’ is applied to any things which possess the quality of greatness (bzzhattva, ‘from the root ‘brzh’); but primarily denotes that which possesses greatness, of essential nature as well as of qualities, in unlimited fulness; and such is only the Lord of all. Hence the word ‘Brahman’ primarily denotes him alone, and in a secondary derivative sense only those things which possess some small part of the Lord’s quali- ties ; for it would be improper to assume several meanings for the word (so that it would denote primarily or directly more than one thing) The case is analogous to that of the term ‘bhagavat!. The Lord only is enquired into, for the sake of immortality, by all those who are afflicted with the triad of pain. Hence the Lord: of all is that Brahman which, according to the Sfitra, constitutes the object of enquiry. The word ‘gigiiasa’ is a desiderative formation meaning ‘desire to know. And as in the

a u

! «Bhagavat' denotes primarily the Lord, the Divinity; second- arily anv holy person.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 5

case of any desire the desired object is the chief thing, the Sütra means to enjoin knowledge — which is the object of the desire of knowledge. The purport of the entire Sütra then is as follows: ‘Since the fruit of works known through the earlier part of the Mimamsa is limited and non-permanent, and since the fruit of the knowledge of Brahman—which knowledge is to be reached through the latter part of the Mimáz;sá—is unlimited and permanent; for this reason Brahman is to be known, after the knowledge of works has previously taken place.—The same meaning is expressed by the Vz;ttikára when saying ‘after the comprehension of works has taken place there follows the enquiry into Brahman.’ And that the enquiry into works and that into Brahman constitute one body of doctrine, he (the Vzzttikára) will declare later on ‘this Sáriraka-doctrine is connected with Gaimini's doctrine as contained in sixteen adhyáyas; this proves the two to constitute one body of doctrine. Hence the earlier and the later Mimáz:sáà are separate only in so far as there is a difference of matter to be taught by each ; in the same way as the two halves ef the Pürva Mimamsa-sitras, con- sisting of six adhyáyas each, are separate! ; and as each adhyáya is separate. The entire Mimázzsá-sástra—which ' begins with the Sütra ‘Now therefore the enquiry into religious duty’ and concludes with the Sutra ‘(From there is) no return on account of scriptural statement '—has, owing to the special character of the contents, a definite order of internal succession. This is as follows. At first the precept ‘one is to learn one's own text (svádhyáya)' enjoins the apprehension of that aggregate of syllables which is called ‘ Veda, and is here referred to as ‘sva- dhyáya. Next there arises the desire to know of what nature the ‘ Learning’ enjoined is to be, and how it is to be done. Here there come in certain injunctions such as

S

1 The first six books of the Pürva Mîmâmsĝ-sûtras give rules for the fundamental forms of the sacrifice ; while the last six books teach how these rules are to be applied to the so-called modified forms.

6 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. oa a ‘Let a Bráhmaza be initiated in his eighth year’ and ‘ The teacher is to make him recite the Veda’; and certain rules about special observances and restrictions—such as ‘having performed the upákarman on the full moon of .Srávaza or PraushZ/apada according to prescription, he is to study the sacred verses for four months and a half'—which enjoin all the required details.

From all these it is understood that the study en- joined has for its result the apprehension of the aggregate of syllables called Veda, on the part of a pupil who has been initiated by a teacher sprung from a good family, leading a virtuous life, and possessing purity of soul; who practises certain special observances and restric- tions; and who learns by repeating what is recited by the teacher. |

And this study of the Veda is of the nature of a saz;skára of the text, since the form of the injunction ' the Veda is to be studied’ shows. that the Veda is the object (of the action of studying). By a saz;skára is understood an action whereby something is fitted to produce some other effect ; and that the Veda should be the object of such a saz;skára is quite appropriate, since it gives rise to the knowledgc

of the four chief ends of human action—viz. religious duty,

wealth, pleasure, and final release—and of the means to effect them; and since it helps to effect those ends by itself also, viz. by mere mechanical repetition (apart from any knowledge to which it may give rise).

The injunction as to the study of the Veda thus aims only at the apprehension of the aggregate of syllables (constituting the Veda) according to certain rules; it is in this way analogous to the recital of mantras.

It is further observed that the Veda thus apprehended thrqugh reading spontaneously gives rise to the ideas of certain things subserving certain purposes. A person, therefore, who has dosis notions of those things imme- diately, i.e. on the mere apprehension of the text of the Veda through réading, thereupon naturally applies himself to the study of the Mim&z:sá, which consists in a methodical discussion of the sentences constituting the text of the

I ADHYAYA, I PÁDA, I. 7

Veda, and has for its result the accurate determination of the nature of those things and their different modes. Through this study the student ascertains the character of the injunctions of work which form part of the Veda, and observes that all work leads only to non-permanent results ; and as, on the other hand, he immediately becomes aware that the Upanishad sections—which form part of the Veda which he has apprehended through reading— refer to an infinite and permanent result, viz. immortality, he applies himself to the study of the Sáriraka-Mímázzsá, which consists in a systematic discussion of the Vedánta- texts, and has for its result the accurate determination of their sense. That the fruit of mere works is transitory, while the result of the knowledge of Brahman is something permanent, the Vedánta-texts: declare in many places— ‘And as here the world acquired by work perishes, so there the world acquired by merit perishes’ (KA. Up. VIII, 1, 6); ‘That work of his has an end’ (Bzz. Up. HI, 8, 10); * By non-permanent works the Permanent is not obtained ' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 10); ‘Frail indeed are those boats, the sacrifices’ (Mu. Up. I, 2, 7); ‘Let a Bráhmaza, after he has examined all these worlds that are gained by works, acquire freedom from all desires. What is not made can- not be gained by what is made. To understand this, let the pupil, with fuel in his hand, go to a teacher who is learned and dwells entirely in Brahman. To that pupil who has approached him respectfully, whose mind is alto- gether calm, the wise teacher truly told that knowledge of Brahman through which he knows the imperishable. true Person’ (Mu. Up. I, 2, 12, 13).— Told’ here means ‘he is to tell?—On the other hand. ‘He who knows Brah- man attains the Highest’ (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1); ‘He who sees this does not see death’ (K4. Up. VII, 26, 2); ‘He becomes a self-ruler’ (&Z. Up. VII, 25, 2); ‘Knowing him, he becomes immortal here’ (Taitt. Ar. III, 12, 7); * Having known him he passes over death ; there is no other path to go’ (Svet. Up. VI, 15); ‘Having known as separate his Self and the Mover, pleased thereby he goes to immortality

(Svet. Up. I, 6).

*

8 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

But—an objection here is raised—the mere learning of the Veda with its auxiliary disciplines gives rise to the know- ledge that the heavenly world and the like are the results of works, and that all such results are transitory, while immortality is the fruit of meditation on Brahman. Pos- séssing such knowledge, a person desirous of final release may at once proceed to the enquiry into Brahmafi; and what need is there of a systematic consideration of religious duty (i.e. of the study of the Parva Mímázzs&) ?—If this reasoning were valid, we reply, the person desirous of release need not even apply himself to the study of the Sáriraka Mimáz:zsá, since Brahman is known from the mere reading of the Veda with its auxiliary disciplines.— True. Such knowledge arises indeed immediately (without deeper enquiry. But a matter apprehended in this immediate way is not raised above doubt and mistake. Hence a sys- tematic discussion of the Vedánta-texts must be under- taken in order that their sense may be fully ascertained.— We agree. But you will have to admit that for the very same reason we must undertake a systematic enquiry into religious duty !

THE SMALL PÜRVAPAKSHA.

But—a further objection is urged—as that which has to precede the systematic enquiry into Brahman we should assign something which that enquiry necessarily presup- poses. The enquiry into the nature of duty, however, does not form such a prerequisite, since a consideration of the Vedánta-texts may be undertaken by any one who has read those texts, even if he is not acquainted with works. —But in the Vedánta-texfs there are enjoined medita- tions on the Udgitha and the like which are matters auxiliary to works; and such meditations are not possible for him who is not acquainted with those works I—Y ou who raise this objection clearly are ignorant of what kind of knowledge the .Sárfraka MimamsA is concerned with! What that sástra aims “at is to destroy completely that

OA ae LL A——— Ht a 1

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 9

wrong knowledge which is the root of all pain, for man, liable to birth, old age, and death, and all the numberless other evils connected with transmigratory existence—évils that spring from the view, due to beginningless Nescience, that there is plurality of existence; and to that end the sástra endeavours to establish the knowledge of the unity of the Self. Now to this knowledge, the knowledge of works—which is based on the assumption of plurality of existence—is not only useless but even opposed. The consideration of the Udgitha and the like, which is sup- plementary to works only, finds a place in the Vedanta- texts, only because like them it is of the nature of know- ledge; but it has no direct connexion with the true topic of those texts. Hence some prerequisite must be indicated which has reference to the principal topic of the sástra.— Quite so; and this prerequisite is just the knowledge of works ; for scripture declares that final release results from knowledge with works added. The Sütra-writer himself says further on ‘And there is need of all works, on account of the scriptural statement of sacrifices and the like’ (Ve. Sd. III, 4,26). And if the required works were not known, one could not determine which works have to be combined . with knowledge and which not. Hence the knowledge of works is just the necessary prerequisite.—Not so, we reply. That which puts an end to Nescience is exclu- ,sively the knowledge of Brahman, which is pure intelligence and antagonistic to all plurality. For final release consists just in the cessation of Nescience; how then can works—to which there attach endless differences connected with caste, Asrama, object to be accomplished, means and mode of accomplishment, &c.—ever supply a, means for the cessation of ignorance, which is essentially the cessation of the view that difference exists? That works, the results of which are transitory, are contrary to final release, and that such release can. be effected through knowledge only, scripture declares in many places; compare all the passages quoted above (p. 7).

As to the assertion that knowledge requires sacrifices and other works, we remark that—as follows from the

IO VEDÁNTA-SÜTRAS. ———————— e o Le o 0t essential contrariety of knowledge and works, and as further appears from an accurate consideration of the words of Scripture—pious works can contribute only towards the rise of the desire of knowledge, in so far namely as they clear the internal organ (of knowledge), but can have no influence on the production of the fruit, i.e. knowledge itself. For the scriptural passage concerned runs as fol- lows: ' Bráhmazas desire to know him by the study of the Veda, by sacrifice, by gifts,’ &c. (Bri. Up. XL, 4, 22).

According to this passage, the desire only of knowledge springs up through works; while another text teaches that calmness, self-restraint, and so on, are the direct means for the origination of knowledge itself. (Having become tran- quil, calm, subdued, satisfied, patient, and collected, he is to see the Self within the Self (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 23).)

The process thus is as follows. After the mind of a man has been cleaned of all impurities through works per- formed in many preceding states of existence, without a view to special forms of reward, there arises in him the desire of knowledge, and thereupon—through knowledge itself originated by certain Scriptural texts— Being only, this was in the beginning, one only without a second’

(KZ. Up. VI, 1, 2); ‘Truth, Knowledge, the Infinite, is `

Brahman’ (Taitt. Up. II, 1); * Without parts, without actions, calm, without fault, without taint’ (Svet. Up. VI, 19) ; * This

. Self is Brahman’ (By. Up. II, 5, 19); ‘Thou art that’ (Kh.

Up. VI, 9, 7), Nescience comes to an end. Now, ‘hear-

ing,’ ‘reflection,’ and ‘Meditation, are helpful towards:

cognising the sense of these Vedic texts. * Hearing’ (sravaga) means the apprehension of the sense of Scripture, together with collateral arguments, from a teacher who possesses the true insight, viz. that the Vedánta-texts establish the doctrine of the ‘unity of the Self. * Reflec- tion" (mananam) means the confirmation within-oneself of the sense taught by the teacher, by means of arguments Showing it alone to be suitable, < Meditation ’ (nididhyása- nam) finally means the constant holding of that sense before one's mind, so as to dispel thereby the antagonistic begin- ningless imagination of plurality. In the case of him who

I ADHYAYA, I PÁDA, I. II

through ‘hearing, ‘reflection, and meditation, has dis- dispelled the entire imagination of plurality, the knowledge of the sense of Vedánta-texts puts an end to Nescience ; and what we thereforc require is a statement of the indis- pensable prerequisites of such ‘ hearing,’ ‘ reflection,’ and so on. Now of such prerequisites there are four, viz. dis- crimination of what is permanent and what is non-perma- nent; the full possession of calmness of mind, self-restraint and similar means; the renunciation of all enjoyment of fruits here below as well as in the next world; and the desire of final release.

Without these the desire of knowledge cannot arise; and they are therefore known, from the very nature of the matter, to be necessary prerequisites. To sum up: The root of bondage is the unreal view of plurality which itself . has its root in Nescience that conceals the true being of Brahman. Bondage itself thus is unreal, and is on that account cut short, together with its root, by mere know- ledge. Such knowledge is originated by texts such as ‘That art thou’; and work is of no help either towards its nature, or its origination, or its fruit (i.e. release) It is on the other hand helpful towards the desire of knowledge, which arises owing to an increase of the element of good- ness (sattva) in the soul, due to the destruction of the elements of passion (ragas) and darkness (tamas) which are the root of all moral evil. This use is referred to in the text quoted above, *Bráhmazas wish to know him, &c. | As, therefore, the knowledge of works is of no use towards the knowiedge of Brahman, we must acknowledge as the prerequisite of the latter knowledge the four means men- tioned above. $

THE SMALL SIDDHÂNTA.

To this argumentation we make the following reply. We admit that release consists only in the cessation of Nescience, and that this cessation results entirely from the knowledge of Brahman. Rut a distinction has here to be made regarding the nature of this knowledge which

*

12 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

the Vedánta-texts aim at enjoining for the purpose of putting an end to Nescience. Is it merely the know- ledge of the sense of sentences which originates from the sentences? or is it knowledge in the form of meditation (upásana) which has the knowledge just referred to, as its antecedent? It cannot be knowledge of the former kind; - for such knowledge springs from the mere apprehension of the sentence, apart from any special injunction, and more- over we do not observe that the cessation of Nescience is effected by such knowledge merely. Our adversary will perhaps attempt to explain things in the following way. The Vedánta-texts do not, he will say, produce that know- ledge which makes an end of Nescience, so long as the imagination of plurality is not dispelled. And the fact that such knowledge, even when produced, does not at once and for every one put a stop to the viéw of plurality by no means subverts my opinion; for, to mention an analogous in- stance, the double appearance of the moon— presenting itself to a person affected with a certain weakness of vision— does not come to an end as soon as the oneness of the moon has been apprehended by reason. Moreover, even without having come to an end, the view of plurality is powerless to effect further bondage, as soon as the root, i. e. Nescience, has once been cut. But this defence we are unable to admit. It is impossible that knowledge should not arise when its means, i. e. the texts conveying knowledge, are once present. And we observe that even when there exists an antagonistic imagination (interfering with the rise of know- ledge), information given by competent persons, the pres- ence of characteristic marks (on which a correct inference may be based), and the like give rise to knowledge which sublates the erroneous imagination. Nor can. we admit that even after the sense of texts has been apprehended, he view of plurality may continue owing to some small remainder of beginningless imagination. For as this ima- . gination which constitutes the means for the view of _ plurality is itself false, it is necessarily put an end to by the rise of true knowledge. If this did not take place, that imagination would never come to an end, since there is no

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. I3

CON a a ree

other means but knowledge to effect its cessation. To say

that the view of plurality, which is the effect of that imagi-

nation, continues even after its root has been cut, is mere nonsense. The instance of some one seeing the moon double is not analogous. For in his case the non-cessation of wrong knowledge explains itself from the circumstance that the cause of wrong knowledge, viz. the real defect of the eye which does not admit of being sublated by know- ledge, is not removed, although that which would sublate wrong knowledge is near. On the other hand, effects, sucb as fear and the like, may come to an end because they can be sublated by means of knowledge of superior force. Moreover, if it were true that knowledge arises through the dispelling of the imagination of plurality, the rise of know- ledge would really never be brought about. For the imagination of plurality has through gradual growth in the course of beginningless time acquired an infinite strength, and does not therefore admit of being dispelled by the comparatively weak conception of non-duality. Hence we conclude that the knowledge which the Vedanta-texts aim at inculcating is a knowledge other than the mere knowledge of the sense of sentences, and denoted by ‘dhyana, *upásaná' (i. e. meditation), and similar terms. With this agree scriptural texts such as ‘Having known it, let him practise meditation’ (Bzz. Up. IV, 4, 21); ‘He who, having searched out the Self, knows it’ (KA. Up. VIII, 7, 1); ‘Meditate on the Self as Om' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 6); * Having known that, he 1s freed from the jaws of death’ (Ka. Up. I, 3, 15); ‘Let a man meditate on the Self only as his world’ (Bri. Up. I, 4, Da G SAN is to be seen, to be heard, to be reflzcted on, to be medi- tated on’ (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 6); ‘That we must search out, that we must try to understand (KA, Up. VIII, 7a i) (According to the principle of the oneness of purport of the different sákhás) all these texts must be viewed as agreeing in meaning with the injunction of meditation contained in the passage quoted from the Byz. Up.; and what they enjoin is therefore meditation. In the firs! and second passages quoted, the words ‘having known’ and

I4 VEDÁNTA-SÜTRAS.

‘having searched out’ (vigZáya ; anuvidya) contain a mere reference to (not injunction of) the apprehension of the meaning of texts, such apprehension subserving medi- tation; while the injunction of meditation (which is the true purport of the passages) is conveyed by the clauses ‘let him practise meditation" (pragZázz kurvita) and ‘he knows it. In the same way the clause ‘the Self is to be heard’ is a mere anuváda, i.e. a mere reference to what is already established by other means; for a person who has read the Veda observes that it contains instruction about matters connected with certain definite purposes, and then on his own account applies himself. to methodical ‘hearing, in order definitely to ascertain these matters; ‘hearing’ thus is established already. In the same way the clause ‘the Self is to be reflected upon’ is a mere

anuváda of reflection which is known as a means of con-

firming what one has ‘heard.’ It is therefore meditation only which all those texts enjoin. In agreement with this a later Sütra also says, ‘ Repetition more than once, on account of instruction’ (Ve. Sd. IV, x, 1). That the knowledge intended to be enjoined as the means of final release is of the nature of meditation , we conclude from the

circumstance that the terms ‘knowing’ and ‘meditating’ |

are seen to be used in place of each other in the earlier and later parts of Vedic texts.: Compare the following passages: “Let a man meditate on mind as Brahman,’ and ‘he who knows this shines and warms through his celebrity, fame, and glory of countenance’ (K/7. Up. III, 18, 1; 6). And ‘He does not know him, for he is not complete, and *Let men meditate on him as the Self’ (Bzz.Up.T,4,.7) Ard “He who knows what he knows,’ and ‘Teach me the deity on which you meditate’ (K4. UD, JIN, at, (p 2): n

‘ Meditation ' means Steady remembrance, i.e. a con- tinuity of steady remembrance, uninterrupted like the flow of oil; in agreement with the Scriptural passage which declares steady "remembrance to be the means of release, ‘on the attainment of remembrance all the ties are loosened’ (Kh. Up. VIT, 26, 2). Such remembrance is of

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I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. I5

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the same character (form) as seeing (intuition); for the passage quoted has the same purport as the following one, ‘The fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are solved, and all the works of that man perish when he has been seen who is high and low’ (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8). And this being so, we conclude that the passage ‘the Self is to be seen’ teaches that ‘ Meditation ' has the character of ‘see- ing’ or ‘intuition? And that remembrance has the character of ‘seeing’ is due to the element of imagination (representation) which prevails in it. All this has been set forth at length by the Vákyakára. ‘Knowledge (vedana) means meditation (updsana), scripture using the word in that sense’; i.e. in all Upanishads that knowledge which is enjoined as the means of final releasé is Meditation. The Vákyakára then propounds a pürvapaksha (primá facie view), *Once he is to make the meditation, the matter

'enjoined by scripture being accomplished thereby, as in the

case of the prayágas and the like'; and then sums up against this in the words * but (meditation) is established on account of the term meditation’; that means—know- ledge repeated more than once (i.e. meditation) is deter- mined to be the means of Release.— The Vákyakára then goes on ‘ Meditation is steady remembrance, on the ground of observation and statement.’ That means—this know- ledge, of the form of meditation, and repeated more than

once, is of the nature of steady remembrance.

Such remembrance has been declared to be of the character of ‘seeing, and this character of seeing consists in its possessing the character of immediate presentation (pratyakshata). With reference to remembrance, which thus acquires the character of immediate presentation and is the means of final release, scripture makes a further determina- tion, viz. in the passage Ka. Up. II, 23, ‘That Self cannot be gained by the study of the V. ade (“reflection”), nor by thought (“ meditation”), nor by much hearing. Whom the Self chooses, by him it may be gained; to him the Self reveals its being. This text says at first that mere hear- ing, reflection, and meditation do not suffice to gain the Self, and then declares, ‘Whom the Self chooses, by him

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16 VEDÁNTA-SÜTRAS. EBENSO

it may be gained. Now a ‘chosen’ one means a most beloved person; the relation being that he by whom that Self is held most dear is most dear to the Self. That the Lord (bhagaván) himself endeavours that this most beloved person should gain the Self, he himself declares in the following words, ‘To those who are constantly devoted and worship with love I give that knowledge by which they reach me’ (Bha. Gi. X, 10), and ‘To him who has know- ledge I am dear above all things, and he is dear to me’ (Vil, 17) Hence, he who possesses remembrance, marked by the character of immediate presentation (s&ákshátkára), and which itself is dear above'all things since the object remembered is such ; he, we say, is chosen by the highest Self, and by him the highest Self is gained. Steady remembrance of this kind is designated by the word ‘devotion’ (bhakti); for this term has the same meaning as updsand (meditation) For this reason scripture and smriti agree in making the following declarations, ‘A man knowing him passes over death’ (Svet. Up. HI, 8); * Know- ing him thus he here becomes immortal’ (Taitt. Ar. TII, 12,7); ‘Neither by the Vedas, nor by austerities, nor by gifts, nor by sacrifice can I be so seen as thou hast seen me. But by devotion exclusive I may in this form be known and seen in truth, O Arguna, and also be entered into’ (Bha. Gi. XI, 53, 54); ‘That highest Person, O Partha, may be obtained by exclusive devotion’ (VIII, 22).

That of such steady remembrance sacrifices and so on are means will be declared later on (Ve. Sá. III, 4, 26). Although sacrifices and the like are enjoined with a view to the origination of knowledge (in accordance with the passage ‘They desire to know, Brz. Up. IV, 4, 22), it is only knowledge in the form of meditation which—being daily practised, constantly improved by repetition, and continued up to death—is the means of reaching Brahman, and hence all the works connected with the different conditions of life are to be performed throughout life only for the purpose of originating such knowledge. This the Sütrakára declares in Ve. Sd. IV, x, 12; 16; III, 4, 33) and other places. The Vakyakara also declares that

-—

—

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I 17

————————— Eee Steady remembrance results only from abstention, and so on; his words being ‘This (viz. steady remembrance= meditation) is obtained through abstention (viveka), freeness of mind (vimoka), repetition (abhyása), works (kriyá), virtuous conduct (kalyáza), freedom from dejection (ana- vasáda), absence of exultation (anuddharsha); according to feasibility and scriptural statement. The Vákyakára also gives definitions of all these terms. Abstention (viveka)

"means keeping the body clean from all food, impure either ` Owing to species (such as the flesh of certain animals), or

abode (such as food belonging to a Kandla or the like), or accidental cause (such as food into which a hair or the like has fallen). The scriptural passage authorising this point is KZ. Up. VII, 26, ‘The food being pure, the mind becomes pure; the mind being pure, there results steady remembrance.’ Freeness of mind (vimoka) means absence of attachment to desires. The authoritative passage here is * Let him meditate with a calm mind’ (X À. Up. III, 14, x). Repetition means continued practice. For this point the Bháshya-kára quotes an authoritative text from Smrzti, viz.: ‘ Having censtantly been absorbed in the thought of that being’ (sada tadbhávabhávitaz ; Bha. Gi. VIII, 6).—By ‘works’ (kriyá) is understood the performance, according to one’s ability, of the five great sacrifices. The authori- tative passages here are ‘This person who performs works is the best of those who know Brahman’ (Mu. Up. III, 1,4); and ‘Him Brahmawas seek to know by recitation of the Veda, by sacrifice, by gifts, by penance, by fasting’ (Bz. Up. IV, 4, 22).—By virtuous conduct (kalyázáni) are meant truthfulness, honesty; kindness, liberality, gentleness, absence of covetousness. Confirmatory texts are ‘ By truth he is to be obtained’ (Mu. Up. III, 1, 5), and ‘to them belongs that pure Brahman-werld’ (Pr. Up. I, 16).—That lowness of spirit or want of cheerfulness which results from unfavourable conditions of place or time and‘the remem- brance of causes of sorrow, is denoted by the term * dejec- tion’; the contrary of this is ‘freedom from dejection.’ The relevant scriptural passage is ‘This Self cannot be obtained by one lacking in strength’ (Mu. Up. III, 2, 4).

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18 VEDÂNTA-SÛTRAS.

TRETIA O AO UAE aes ee SER

—* Exultation' is that satisfaction of mind which springs from circumstances opposite to those just mentioned; the contrary is *absence of 'exultation. Overgreat satisfaction also stands in the way (of meditation) The scriptural passage for this is ‘Calm, subdued, &c. (Brr. Up. IV, 4, 23).—What the Vákyakára means to Say is therefore that knowledge is realised only through the performance of the duly prescribed works, on the part of a person fulfilling all the enumerated conditions.

Analogously another scriptural. passage says ‘He who knows both knowledge and non-knowledge together, over- coming death by non-knowledge reaches the Immortal through. knowledge’ (is. Up. 11). Here the term ‘non- knowledge’ denotes the works enjoined on the different castes and Asramas; and the meaning of the text is that, having discarded by such works death, i.e. the previous works antagonistic to the origination of knowledge, a man reaches the Immortal, i.e. Brahman, through knowledge. The non-knowledge of which this passage speaks as being the means of overcoming death can only mean that which is other than knowledge, viz. prescribed works. The word has:the same sense in the following passage: ‘ Firm in traditional knowledge he offered many sacrifices, leaning on the knowledge of Brahman, so as to pass beyond death by non-knowledge' (Vi. Pu. VI, 6, 12).—Antagonistic to knowledge (as said above) are all good and evil actions, and hence—as equally giving rise to an undesirable result—they may both be designated as evil. They stand in the way of the origination of knowledge in so far as they strengthen the elements of passion and darkness which are antagonistic to the element of goodness which is the cause of the rise of knowledge. That evil works stand in the way of such origination, the following scriptural text declares: ‘He makes him whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds do an evil decd’ (Ka. Up. III, 8). That passion and darkness vcil the knowledge of truth while goodness on the other hand gives rise to it, the Divine one has declared himself, in the passage ‘From goodness springs knowledge’ (Bha. Gi. XIV, 17) Hence, in order that

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I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. IO ————————— eee knowledge may arise, evil works have to be got rid of, and this is effected by the performance of acts of religious duty not aiming at some immediate result (such as the heavenly world and the like); according to the text ‘by works-of religious duty he discards all evil.’ Knowledge which is the means of reaching Brahman, thus requires the works prescribed for the different asramas; and hence the systematic enquiry into works (i.e. the Pürva Mimamsa) —from which we ascertain the nature of the works required and also the transitoriness and limitation of the fruits of mere works—forms a necessary antecedent to the systematic enquiry into Brahman. Moreover the discrimination of permanent and non-permanent things. &c. (i.e. the tetrad of ‘means’ mentioned above, p. 11) cannot be accom- plished without the study of the Mimá;zsá ; for unless we ascertain all the distinctions of fruits of works, means. modes of procednre and qualification (on the part of the agent) we can hardly understand the true nature of works. their fruits, the transitoriness or non-transitoriness of the latter, the permanence of the Self, and similar matters. That those conditions (viz. nityánityavastuviveka, sama, dama, &c.) are ‘means’ must be determined on the basis of viniyoga (‘application’ which determines the relation of principal and subordinate matters—angin and aga); and this viniyoga which depends on. direct scriptural state- ment (sruti), inferential signs (liga). and so on. is treated of in the third book of the Parva Mimàzrzsá-sütras. And further we must, in this connexion, consider also the nieditations on the Udgitha and similar things— which.

although aiming at the success of works, are of the nature

of reflections on Brahman (which is-viewed in them under various forms)—and as such have referencé to knowledge of Brahman. Those works also (with which these meditations are connected) aim at no special results of théir own, and produce and help to perfect the knowledge of Brahman: they are therefore particularly connected with the enquiry into Brahman. And that these meditations presuppose an understanding of the nature of works is. admitted by every one. C 2

VEDANTA-SUTRAS. ee oe S — —

N O

THE GREAT PURVAPAKSHA.

The only Reality is Brahman.

Brahman, which is pure intelligence and opposedeto all difference, constitutes the only reality ; and everything else, i. e. the plurality of manifold knowing subjects, objects of knowledge, and acts of knowledge depending on those two, is only imagined on (or ‘in ’) that Brahman, and is essentially false.

‘In the beginning, my dear, there was that only which is, one only without a second’ (KZ. Up. VI, 2, 1): The higher knowledge is that by which the Indestructible is apprehended' (Mu. Up. 1, 1, 5); ‘That which cannot be seen nor seized, which has no eyes nor ears, no hands nor feet, the permanent, the all-pervading, the most subtle, the imperishable which the wise regard as the source of all beings' (Mu. Up. I, 1,6); * The True, knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman’ (Taitt. Up. II, 1); ‘He who is without parts, without actions, tranquil, without fault, without taint ' (Svet. Up. VI, 19); ‘By whom it is not thought, by him it is thought; he by whom it is thought knows it not. It is not known by those who know it, known by those who do not know it’ (Ke. Up. II, 3); ‘Thou mayest not see the seer of sight; thou mayest not think the thinker of thought’ (Bri. Up. III, 4, 2) ; * Bliss is Brahman ' (Taitt. Up. III, 6, 1); ‘All this is that Self’ (Bie: Wits IS 7) ‘There is here no diversity whatever’ (Bzz. Up. IV, 4, 19); ‘From death to death goes he who sees any difference here’ (Ka. Up. II, 4, 10); ‘For where there is duality as it were, there'one seestthe other’; ‘but where the Self has become all of him, by what means, and whom, should he see? by what means, and whom, should he know?’ (Brz. Up. IV, 5, 15); 'the effect is a name merely which has its origin in speech ; the truth is that (the thing made of clay) is clay merely’ (X4. Up. VI, 1, 4); ‘for if he makes but the smallest distinction in it there is fear for him’ (Taitt. Up. II, 7) ;—the. two following Vedánta-sütras: III, 2, 11: III, 2, 3—the following passages from the Vishzu-puráza :

—-

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I ADHYÁYA, I PÁDA, I. 21 ‘In which all difference vanishes, which is pure Being, which is not the object of words, which is known by the Self only—that knowledge is called Brahman' (VI, 7, 53) ; ‘Him whose essential nature is knowledge, who is stain- less in, reality’; ‘Him who, owing to erroneous view, abides in the form of things’ (I, 2, 6); ‘the Reality thou art alone, there is no other, O Lord of the world!— whatever matter is seen belongs to thee whose being is knowledge; but owing to their erroneous opinion the non- devout look on it as the form of the world. This whole - world has knowledge for its essential nature, but the Unwise viewing it as being of the nature of material things are driven round on the ocean of delusion. Those however who possess true knowledge and pure minds see this whole world as having knowledge for its Self, as thy form, O highest Lord !' (Vi. Pu. I, 4, 38 ff.).—' Of that Self, although it exists in one's own and in other bodies, the knowledge is of one kind, and that is Reality; those who maintain duality hold a false view’ (II, 14, 31); ‘If there is some other one, different from .me, then it can be said, *I am this and that one is another "' (II, 13, 86); ‘As owing to the difference of the holes of the flute the air equally passing through them all is called by the names of the different notes of the musical scale; so it is with the universal Self' (II, 14, 32) ; * He is I; he is thou ; he is all: this Universe is his form. Abandon the error of difference. The king being thus instructed, abandoned the view of difference, having gained an intuition of Reality" (II, 16, 24). * When that view which gives rise to differ- ence is absolutely destroyed, who then will make the untrue distinction between the individual Self and Brah-- man?’ (VI, 7, 94).—The following passages from the Bhagavad-Gità: ‘I am the Self dwelling withir all beihgs ' (X, 20); ‘ Know me to be the soul within all bodies ' (XIII, 2); ‘Being there is none, movable or immovable, which is without me’ (X, 39).—All these and other texts, the purport of which clearly is instruction as to the essential nature of things, declare that Brahman only, i.e. non-differenced pure intelligence is real, while everything else is false.

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22 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

BENED aT

The appearance of plurality is due to avidy4.

* Falsehood’ (mithyátva) belongs to what admits of being terminated by the cognition of the real thing—such cogni- tion being preceded by conscious activity (not by mere absence of consciousness or knowledge) The snake, e. g. which has for its substrate a rope or the like is false ; for it is due to an imperfection (dosha) that the snake is. imagined in (or ‘on’) the rope. In the same way this entire world, with its distinctions of gods, men, animals, inanimate matter, and so on, is, owing to an imperfection, wrongly imagined in the highest Brahman whose substance ` is mere intelligence, and therefore is false in so far as it may be sublated by the cognition of the nature of the real Brahman. What constitutes that imperfection is beginning- less Nescience (avidyá), which, hiding the truth of things, gives rise to manifold illusions, and cannot be defined either as something that is or as something that is not.—' By the Untrue they are hidden; of them which are true the Untrue is the covering’ (KZ. Up. VIII, 3, 1); * Know Maya to be Prakriti, and the great Lord him who is associated with Maya’ (Svet. Up. IV, 10); ‘Indra appears manifold through the Mayas’ (Bri. Up. II, 5, 19); ‘My Mayé is hard to overcome’ (Bha. Gi. VII, 14); ‘When the soul slumbering in beginningless Maya awakes’ (Gau. Ka. I, 16).—These and similar texts teach that it is through beginningless Maya that to Brahman which truly is pure non-differenced intelligence its own nature hides itself,

and that it sees diversity within itself. As has been said,

‘Because the Holy One is essentially of the nature of intelligence, the form of all, but not material; therefore know that all particular things like rocks, oceans, hills and so on, have proceeded from intelligence’. But when, on

i in agreement with the use made of this passage by the Pürva- pakshin, vig#dna must here be understood in the sense of avidya.

Vigf#anasabdena vividham 97 : d av e yatesneneti karazavyutpattyá xvidyà »bhidhiyate. Sru. Pra. MS sal )

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 2

the cessation of all work, everything is only pure intelli- gence in its own proper form, without any imperfections ; then no differences—the fruit of the tree of wishes—any longer exist between things. Therefore nothing whatever, at anv place or any time, exists apart from intelligence: intelligence, which is one only, is viewed as manifold by those whose minds are distracted by the effects of their own works. Intelligence pure, free from stain, free from grief, free from all contact with desire and other affections, everlastingly one is the highest Lord—Vasudeva apart from whom nothing exists. I have thus declared to you the lasting truth of things—that intelligence only is-true and everything else untrue. And that also which is the cause of ordinary worldly existence has been declared to.

you’ (Vi. Pu. II, 12, 39, 40, 43-45).

Avidy& is put an end to by true Knowledge.

Other texts declare that this Nescience comes to an end through the cognition of the essential unity of the Self with Brahman which is nothing but non-differenced intelli- gence. ' He does not again go to death ;' «He sees this

as one;’ ‘ He who sees this does not see death’ (KZ. Up.

VI, 27); *When he finds freedom from fear and rest in that which is-invisible, incorporeal, undefined, unsupported, then he has obtained the fearless’ (Taitt. Up. H, 7) Wee fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are solved and all his works perish wh'n he has been beheld-who is high and low’ (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8); ‘ He knows: Brahman; he becomes Brahman only’ (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9); *Knowing him only a man passes over death; there is no other path to go" (Svet. Up. III, 8). In these and similar passages, the term ‘death’ denotes Nescience ; analogously to the use of the term in the following words of Sanatsugáta, ' Delusion I call death ; and freedom from delusion I call: immortality ' (Sanatsug. II, 5). The knowledge again of the essential. unity and non-difference i Brahman—which is ascertained from decisive texts such as * The True, knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman’ (Taitt. Up. IT; 1); * Knowledge, bliss is

24 VEDÁNTA-SÜTRAS.

Brahman’ (Bri. Up. III, 9, 28)—is confirmed by other passages, such as ‘Now if a man meditates on another deity, thinking the deity is one and he another, he does not know’ (Bri. Up. I, 4, 10); ‘Let men meditate upon him as.the Self’ (Bri. Up. I, 4, 7): ‘Thou art that? (Kz. Up. VI, 8, 7); ‘Am I thou, O holy deity? and art thou me, O holy deity ?’; ‘What I am that is he; what he is that am I’—This the Sûtrakâra himself will declare ‘ But as the Self (scriptural texts) acknowledge and make us apprehend (the Lord)’ (Ve. Sa. IV, 1, 3). Thus the Vakya- kara also, ‘It is the Self—thus one should apprehend (every- thing), for everything is effected by that.’ And to hold that by such cognition of the oneness of Brahman essentially false bondage, together with its cause, comes to an end, is only reasonable.

Scripture is of greater force than Perception.

But, an objection is 1aised—how can knowledge, spring- ing from the sacred texts, bring about a cessation of the view of difference, in manifest opposition to the evidence of Perception?—How then, we rejoin, can the knowledge that this thing is a rope.and not a snake bring about, in opposition to actual perception, the cessation of the (idea of the) snake ?—You will perhaps reply that in this latter case there is a conflict between two forms of perception, while in the case under discussion the conflict is between direct perception and Scripture which is based on percep- tion. But against this we would ask the question how, in the case of a conflict between two equal cognitions, we decide as to which of the two is refuted (sublated) by the other. If—as is to be expected—you reply that what makes the difference between the two is that one of them is due to a defective cause while the other is not: we point out that this distinction holds good also in the case of Scripture and perception being in conflict. It is not con- siderations as to- the cquality of conflicting cognitions, as to their being dependent or independent, and so.on, that- determine which of the two sublates the other ; if that were

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I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 25

e A e

the case, the perception which presents to us the flame of the lamp as one only would not be sublated by the cogni- tion arrived at by inference that there is a succession of different flames, Wherever there is a conflict between cognitions based on two different means of knowledge we assign the position of the ‘sublated one’ to that which admits of being accounted for in some other way; while that cognition which affords no opening for being held unauthoritative and cannot be accounted for in another way, is the ‘sublating one! This is the principle on which the relation between ‘ what sublates’ and ‘what is sublated ' is decided everywhere. Now apprehension of Brahman— which is mere intelligence, eternal, pure, free, self-luminous —is effected by Scripture which rests on endless unbroken tradition, cannot therefore be suspected of any, even the least, imperfection, and hence cannot be non-authoritative ; the state of bondage, on the other hand, with its manifold distinctions is proved by Perception, Inference, and so on, which are capable of imperfections and therefore may be non-authoritative. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the state of bondage is put an end to by the appre- hension of Brahman. And that imperfection of which Perception—through which we apprehend a world of mani- fold distinctions—may be assumed to be capable, is so- called Nescience, which consists in the beginningless wrong imagination of difference—Well then—a further objection is raised—let us admit that Scripture is perfect because NENNEN SE ee j 1 The distinction is illustrated by the different views Perception | z and Inference cause us to take of the nature of the flame of the ‘lamp. To Perception the flame, as long as it burns, seems one and the same: but on the ground of the "observation that the different particles of the wick dnd the oil are consumed in succes- sion, we infer that there are many distinct flames succeeding one another. And we accept the Inference as valid, and as sublating or refuting the immediate perception, because the perceived oneness of the flame admits of being accounted for ‘otherwise,’ viz. on the -ground of the many distinct flames originating in such. rapid suc- cession that the eye mistakes them for one. . The inference on the other hand does not admit of being explained in another way.

RSR SALI RY ACC. NO... 4

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26 VEDANTA-SUTKAS.

resting on an endless unbroken tradition; but must we then not admit that texts evidently presupposing the view of duality, as e.g. ‘Let him who desires the heavenly world offer the Gyotishzoma-sacrifice ’—are liable to refuta- tion ?—True, we reply. As in the case of the Udg&tzz and Pratihart/7 breaking the chain (not at the same time, but) in succession !, so here also the earlier texts (which refer to duality and transitory rewards) are sublated by- the later texts which teach final release, and are not themselves sublated by anything else.

The texts which represent Brahman as devoid of e qualities have greater force.

The same reasoning applies to those passages in the Vedánta-texts which inculcate meditation on the qualified Brahman, since the highest Brahman is without any quali- ties.—But consider such passages as ‘He who cognises all, who knows all' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9); ‘His high .power is revealed as manifold, as essential, acting as force and knowledge’ (Svet. Up. VI, 8); ‘He whose wishes are true, whose purposes are true’ (Kz. Up. VIII, 1, 5); how can these passages, which clearly aim at defining the nature of Brahman, be liable to refutation ?—Owing to the greater weight, we reply, of those texts which set forth Brahman as devoid of qualities. ‘It is not coarse, not fine, not short, not long’ (Bzz. Up. III, 8, 9); 'The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman’ (Taitt, Up. II, 1); * That which is free from qualities, ‘that which is free from stain’—these and similar texts convey the notion of. Brahman being change- less, eternal intelligence devoid of all difference; while the other texts—quoted before—teach the qualified Brahman. And there being a conflict between the two sets of passages, i we—according to the Mimázzsà principle referred to above

—decide that the texts referring to Brahman as devoid of qualities are of greater force, because they are later in

— á———ÀÀ — eee B

t— ——— —

* The reference is to the point discussed Pà ne S â . . Mi. SQ. VI, 5, (Gaim. Nyâ. Mala Vistara, p. 285). 5» 54

: |

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 277 I LLL E A ON order! than those which speak of Brahman as having quali- ties. Thus everything is settled.

The text Taitt. Up. II, 1 refers to Brahman as devoid of qualities.

But—an objection is raised—even the passage ‘ The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman’ intimates certain qualities of Brahman, viz. true being, knowledge, infinity I—Not so, we reply. From the circumstance that all the terms of the sentence stand in co-ordination, it follows that they convey - the idea of one matter (sénse) only. If against this you urge that the sentence may convey the idea of one matter only, even if directly expressing a thing distinguished by several qualities; we must remark that you display an ignorance of the meaning of language which appears to point to some weakmindedness on your part. A sentence conveys the idea of one matter (sense) only when all its constitutive words denote one and the same thing; if, on the other hand, it expresses a thing possessing several attributes, the difference of these attributes necessarily leads to a difference in meaning on the part of the individual words, and then the oneness of meaning of the sentence is lost.— But from your view of the passage it would follow that the several words are mere synonyms l—Give us your attention,'we reply, and learn that several words’ may convey one meaning without being idle synonyms. From the determination of the unity of purport of the whole sentence ? we conclude that the several words, applied to one thing, aim at expressing what is opposite in nature to whatever is contrary to the meanings of the several words, and that thus they have meaning and unity of meaning and yet are not mere synonyms. The details

1 The texts which deny all qualities of Brahman are later in

‘order than the texts which refer to Brahman as qualified, because

denial presupposes that which is to be denied. 2 The unity of purport of the sentence is inferred from its con- stituent words having the same case-ending. -

28 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

a

are as follows. Brahman is to be defined as whz-* is con- trary in nature to all other things. Now whatever is opposed to Brahman is virtually set aside by the three words (constituting the definition of Brahman in the Taittiriya-text). The word ‘true’ (or ‘truly being’) has the purport of distinguishing Brahman from whatever things have no truth, as being the abodes of change; the word ‘knowledge’ distinguishes Brahman from all non-sentient things whose light depends on something else (which are not self-luminous); and the word ‘infinite’ distinguishes it from whatever is limited in time or space or nature. Nor is this ‘distinction’ some positive or negative attribute of Brahman, it rather is just Brahman itself as opposed to everything else ; just as the distinction of white colour from ‘black and other colours is just the ‘true nature of white, not an attribute of it. The three words constituting the text thus Zave a meaning, have one meaning, and are non-synonymous, in so far as they .convey the essential distinction of one thing, viz. Brahman from everything else. The text thus declares the one Brahman which is self-luminous and free from all differ- ence. On this interpretation of the text we discern its oneness in purport with other texts, such as ‘Being only . this was in the beginning, one only, without a second.’ Texts such as ‘That from whence these beings are born’ (Taitt. Up, III, 1); * Being only this was in the beginning ' (Kh. Up. VI, 2, 1); ‘Self alone was this in the beginning’ (Bri. Up. I, 4, 1), &c., describe Brahman as the cause of Ebe world; and of this Brahman the Taittiriya passage The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman’ gives the strict definition. In agreement with the principle that all sákhás teach ia i: PE to ünderstand that, in all the be taken as ie E itho po em D UA D «ftus blue o EE. out Second, ie. without any i which aims at definin Brahe eee pod, ae the tosi in accordance with die ch ae E STRUM en see PES being without a second, ° eee ek via it i " ihe statement of the K Zàndogya

COME TIN

l—————

Å

I ADHYÂYA, I PÂDA, I. 20

Ln LL.

as to Brahman being without a second must also be taken to imply that Brahman is non-dual as far as qualities are concerned ; otherwise it would conflict with those passages which speak of Brahman as being without qualities and withous stain. We therefore conclude that the defining Taittiriya-text teaches Brahman to be an absolutely homogeneous substance.

But, the above explanation of the passage being accepted, it follows that the words ‘true being, ‘knowledge, &c., have to be viewed as abandoning their direct sense, and merely suggesting a thing distinct in nature from all that is opposite (to what the three words directly denote), and this means that we resort to so-called implication (implied meaning, lakshazá)!— What objection is there to such a proceeding?. we reply. The force of the general purport of a sentence is greater than that of the direct denotative power of the simple terms, and it is generally admitted that the purport of grammatical co-ordination is oneness (of the matter denoted by the terms co-ordínated).— But we never observe that all words of a sentence are to be understood in an implied sense I.—Is it then not observed, we reply, that ove word is to be taken in its implied mean- ing if otherwise it would contradict the purport of the whole sentence? And if the purport of the sentence, which is nothing but an aggregate of words employed together, has once been ascertained, why should we not take two or three or all words in an implied sense—just as we had taken one—and thus make them fit in with the general purport? In agreement herewith those scholars who

explain to us the sense of imperative sentences, teach that

in imperative sentences belonging to ordinary speech all words have an implied meaning only (not their directly denotative meaning). For, they maintain, imperative forms have their primary meaning only in (Wedic) sentences which enjoin something not established by other means; and hence in ordinary speech the effect of the action is conveyed by implication only. The other words also, which form part of those imperative sentences and denote matters

connected with the action, have their primary meaning

ae a

30 VEDÁNTA-SÜTRAS.

RENE E e o A LL——————— only if connected with an action not established by other means; while if connected with an ordinary action they have a secondary, implied, meaning only +.

Perception reveals to us non-differencec substance only.

We have so far shown that in the case of a conflict between Scripture and Perception and the other instru- ments of knowledge, Scripture is of greater force. The fact, however, is that no such conflict is observed to exist, since Perception, itself gives rise to the apprehension of a non-differenced Brahman whose nature is pure Being.— But how can it be said that Perception, which has for its object things of various kinds—and accordingly expresses itself in judgments such as ‘ Here is a jar, * There.is a piece of cloth'—causes the apprehension of mere Being? If there were -no apprehension of difference, all cognitions would have one and the same object, and therefore would give rise to one. judgment only—as takes place when one unbroken perceptional cognition is continued for some time.—True. We therefore have to enquire in what way,

. 'The theory here referred to is held by some of the Mimam- sakas. The imperative forms of the verb have their primary meaning, i.e. the power of originating action, only in Vedic sentences which enjoin the performance of certain actions for the bringing about of certain ends: no other means of knowledge but the Veda informing us that such ends can be accomplished by such actions. Nobody, e.g. would offer a soma sacrifice in order

to obtain the heavenly world, were he not told by the Veda to do so. In ordinary life, on the other hand, no imperative possesses this entirely unique originative force, since any action which may be performed in consequencé of a command may be prompted by other motives as well: if is, in technical Indian language, established already, apart from the command, by other medie Gl knowledge. The man who, e. g. is told to milk a cow miglit have proceeded to do so, apart from the command, for COR of his own. Imperatives in ordinary speech are therefore held not to. havé their primary meaning, and this conclusion is extended,

somewhat unwarrantably one should say, to all the words entering into an imperative clause.

| $ | | i i

\

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. "OTT

in the judgment * here is a jar, an assertion is made about being as well as some special form of being. These implied judgments cannot both be founded on perception, for they are the results of acts of cognition occupying different moments of time, while the perceptional cognition takes place in one moment (is instantaneous). We therefore must decide whether it is the essential nature of the jar, or its difference from other things, that is the object of perception. And we must adopt the former alternative, because the apprehension of difference presupposes the apprehension of the essential nature of the.thing, and, in addition, the remembrance of its counterentities (i.e. the things from which the given thing differs). Hence. differ- ence is not apprehended by Perception ; and all judgments and propositions relative to difference are founded on error only. !

Difference—bheda—does not admit of logical definition.

The Logicians, moreover, are unable to give a definition of such a thing as ‘difference.’ Difference cannot in the first place be the essential nature (of that which differs) ; for from that it would follow that on the apprehension of the essential nature of a thing there would at once arise not only the judgment as to that essential nature but also judgments as to its difference from everything else.—But, it may be objected to this, even when the essential nature of a thing is apprehended, the judgment *this thing is different from other things? depends on the remembrance of its counterentities, and as long as this remembrance does not take place so long the judgment of difference is not formed I—Such reasoning, we reply, is jnadmissible. He who maintains that ‘difference’ is nothing but ‘essential nature’ has no right to assume a dependence on counterentities since, according to him essential nature and difference are the same, i.e. nothing but essential nature: the judgment of difference can, on his view, depend on counterentities no more than the judgment of essential nature does. His view really implies that the two words ‘the jar’ and ‘different’ (in the judgment ‘the jar is different’) are

32 VEDÁNTA-SÜTRAS.

synonymous, just as the words ‘hasta’ and ‘kara’ are (both of which mean ‘hand’).

Nor, in the second place, can ‘difference’ be held to be an attribute (dharma). For if it were that, we should have to assume that ‘difference’ possesses difference (i. e. is different) from essential nature; for otherwise it would be the same as the latter. . And this latter difference would have to be viewed as an attribute of the first difference, and this would lead us on to a third difference, and so in infinitum. And the view of ‘difference’ being an attribute would further imply that difference is appre- hended on the apprehension of a thing distinguished:by attributes such as generic character and so on, and at the same time that the thing thus distinguished is apprehended on the apprehension of difference; and this would consti- ‘tute a logical seesaw.— Difference’ thus showing itself incapable of logical definition, we are confirmed in our view that perception reveals mere ‘ Being’ only.

‘Moreover, it appears that in states of consciousness such as'Here is a jar, ‘There is a piece of cloth, ‘The jar is perceived, ‘The piece of cloth is perceived, that which constitutes the things is Being (existence ; satta) and per- ception (or *consciousness'; anubhüti) And we observe that it is pure Being only which persists in all states of cognition: this pure Being alone, therefore, is real. The differences, on the other hand, which do not persist, are unreal. The case is analogous to that of the snake-rope. The rope which persists as a substrate is real; while the non-continuous things (which by wrong imagination are superimposed on the rope) such as a snake, a cleft in the ground, a watercourse, and so on, are unreal.

But—our adversary objects—the instance is not truly analogous. In the case of the snaké-fope the non-reality of the snake’ results from the snake's being sublated (badhita) by the cognitign of the true nature of the sub- strate “This is a rope, not a snake’; it does not result from the non-eontinuousness of the snake. In the same way the reality of the rope does not follow from its persist- ence, but from the fact of its being not sublated (by another

I ADHYÁYA, I PADA, I. 33

~ So URN E a

cognition). But what, we ask, establishes the non-reality of jars and pieces of cloth?—All are agreed, we reply, that we observe, in jars and similar things, individual difference (vyávritti, literally ‘separation,’ ‘distinction’). The point to decide is of what nature such difference is. Does it not mean that the judgment ‘This is a jar’ implies the negation of pieces of cloth and other things? But this means that by this judgment pieces of cloth and other things are sublated (bádhita). Individual difference (vyavretti) thus: means the cessation (or absence), due to sublation, of certain objects of cognition, and it proves the non-reality of what- ever has non-continuous existence; while on the other hand, pure Being, like the rope, persists non-sublated. . Hence everything that is additional to pure Being is non-real.— This admits of.being expressed in technical form. ‘Being’ is real because it persists, as proved by the case of the rope in the snake-rope; jars and similar things are non-real because they are non-continuous; as proved by the case of the snake that has the rope for its substrate.

From all this it follows.that persisting consciousness only. has real being ; it alone is. i

Being and Consciousness are one. Consciousness is svayamprakasa.

But, our adversary objects, as mere Being is the object of consciousness, it is different therefrom (and thus there xists after all ‘difference’ or ‘plurality ')—Not so, we reply. That there is no such thing as ‘difference, we have already shown above on the grounds that it is not the object of perception, and moreover incapable of definition. It cannot therefore be proved, that ‘Being’ is the object of consciousness. Hence Consciousness itself is * Being’ that which is.— This censciousness is self-proved, just because it is consciousness. Were it proved through some- thing else, it would follow that like jars and similar things it is not consciousness. Nor can there be assumed, for consciousness, the need of ancther act of consciousness (through which its knowledge would be established); for

[48] D

34 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

it shines forth (prakásate) through its own being. While it exists, consciousness—differing therein from jars and the like—is never observed not to shine forth, and it cannot therefore be held to depend, in its shining forth, on some- thing else.— You (who object to the above reasoning) perhaps hold the following view :—even when conscious- ness has arisen, it is the object only which shines forth— a fact expressed in sentences such as: the jar is perceived. When a person forms the judgment ' This is a jar, he is not at the time conscious of a consciousness which is not an object and is not of a definite character. Hence the . existence of consciousness is the reason which brings about the ‘shining forth’ of jars and other objects, and thus has a similar office as the approximation of the object to the eye or the other organs of sense(which is another condition of perceptive consciousness) After this the existence of consciousness is inferred on the ground that the shining forth of the object is (not permanent, but) occasional only !. And should this argumentation be objected to on the ground of its implying that consciousness—which is essen- tialy of the nature of intelligence—is something non- intelligent. like material things, we ask you to define this negation of non-intelligence (which you declare to be cha- racteristic of consciousness). Have we, perhaps, to under- stand by it the invariable concomitance of existence and shining forth? If so, we point out that this invariable concomitance is also found in the case of pleasure and similar affections; for when pleasure and so on exist at all, they never are non-perceived (i.e. they exist in so far only as we are conscious of them). It is thus clear that we have no consciousness of consciousness itself—just as the tip of a finger, although touching other things, is incapable of touching itself. 4 | cs

All this reasoning, we reply, is entirely spun out of your own fancy, without any due consideration of the power of consciousness. The fact is, that in perceiving colour and

1 . LJ . . Being not permanent but. occasional, it is an effect only, and as such must have a cause.

ETTEN

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 35 other qualities of things, we are not aware of a ‘shining forth’ as an attribute of those things, and as something different from consciousness; nor can the assumption of an attribute of things called ‘light,’ or ‘shining forth, be proved in any way, since the entire empirical world itself can be proved only through consciousness, the existence of which we both admit. Consciousness, therefore, is not something which is inferred or proved through some other act of knowledge; but while proving everything else it is proved by itself. This may be expressed in technical form as follows—Consciousness is, with regard to its attri- butes and to the empirical judgments concerning it, inde- pendent of any other thing, because through its connexion with other things it is the cause of their attributes and the empirical judgments concerning them. For it is a general principle that of two things that which through its connexion with the other is the cause of the attributes of—and the empirical judgments about—the latter, is itself independent of that other as to those two points. We see e.g. that colour, through its conjunction with earth and the like, produces in them the quality of visibility, but does not itself depend for its visibility on conjunction with colour. Hence consciousness is itself the cause of its own ‘shining forth,’ as well as of the empirically observed shining forth of objects such as jars and the like.

Consciousness is eternal and incapable of change.

This self-luminous consciousness, further, is eternal, for it is not capable of any form of non-existence—whether so-called antecedent non-existence or any other form. This follows from its being self-established. For the antecedent non-existence of self-established consciousness cannot be apprehended either through consciousness or anything else. If consciousness itself gave rise to the apprehension of its own non-existence, it could not do so in so far as ‘being, for that would contradict its being: if it is, i. e. if its non-existence is not, how can it give rise to the idea of its non-existence? Nor can it do so if not being ; for if consciousness itself is not, how can it furnish

D2

P4

36 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

CIA A e SS

EEE a proof for its own non-existence? Nor can the non- existence of consciousness be apprehended through any- thing else; for consciousness cannot be the object of anything else. Any instrument of knowledge proving the non-existence of consciousness, could do so only by making consciousness its object—' this is consciousness’; but con- sciousness, as being self-established, does not admit of that objectivation which is implied in the word ‘this,’ and hence its previous non-existence cannot be proved by anything lying outside itself.

As consciousness thus does not admit of antecedent non-existence, it further cannot be held to originate, and hence also all those other states of being which depend on origination cannot be predicated of it.

As consciousness is beginningless, it further does not admit of any plurality within itself; for we observe in this case the presence of something which is contrary to what invariably accompanies plurality (this something being ‘beginninglessness’ which is contrary to the quality of having a beginning—which quality invariably accompanies plurality). For we never observe a thing characterised by plurality to be without a beginning —And moreover differ- ence, origination, &c., are objects of consciousness, like colour and other qualities, and hence cannot be attributes of consciousness. Therefore, consciousness being essentially consciousness only, nothing else that is an object of con- sciousness can be its attribute. The conclusion is that consciousness is free from difference of any kind.

The apparent difference between Consciousness and the conscious subject is due to the unreal &hamkára.

;

From this it further follows that there is no substrate of consciousness—-different from consciousness itself—such as ‘people ordinarily mean when speaking of a‘ knower, It is self-luminous consciousness itself which Constitutes the so-called | knowcr. This follows therefrom also tl t sciousness is not non-intelligent (cada) Meca

b y - for no 2 . ale E n-intelligence invariably accompanies absence of S S

elfhood (anátmatva);

e

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 37

—

hence, non-intelligence being absent in consciousness, con- sciousness is not non-Self, that means, it is the Self.

But, our adversary again objects, the consciousness which expresses itself in the judgment ‘/ know, proves that the quality"of being a * knower' belongs to consciousness I—By no means, we reply. The attribution to consciousness of this quality rests on error, no less than the attribution, to the shell, of the quality of being silver. Consciousness cannot stand in the relation of an agent toward itself: the attribute of being a knowing agent is erroneously imputed to it—an error analogous to that expressed in the judg- ment ‘I am a man,’ which identifies the Self of a person with the outward aggregate of matter that bears the external characteristics of humanity. To be a *knower' means to be the agent in the action of knowing; and this is something essentially changeful and non-intelligent (gada), having its abode in the ahaz:/kára, which is itself a thing subject to change. How, on the other hand, could such agency possibly belong to the changeless ‘ witness ' (of all change, i.e. consciousness) whose nature is pure Being? That agency cannot be an attribute of the Self follows therefrom also that, like colour and other qualities, agency depends, for its own proof, on seeing, i. e. consciousness.

That the Self does not fall within the sphere (is not an object of) the idea of ‘I’ is proved thereby also that in deep sleep, swoon, and similar states, the idea of the ‘1’ is absent, while the consciousness of the Self persists. Moreover, if the Self were admitted to be an agent and an object of the idea of ‘I, it would be difficult to avoid the conclusion that like the body it is non-intelligent, something merely outward (‘being for others only, not for | itself’) and destitute of Selfhood. That from the body, . which is the object of the idea of ‘I,’ and known to be an agent, there is different that Self which enjoys the results of the body’s actions, viz. the heavenly word, and so on, 1s acknowledged by all who admit the validity of the instru- ments of knowledge; analogously, therefore, we must admit that different from the knower whom we understand by the term ‘I,’ is the ' witnessing’ inward Self. The non-

38 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

i by Oe eee

intelligent ahazzkára thus merely serves to manifest the nature of non-changing consciousness, and it effects this by being its abode ; for it is the proper quality of manifest- ing agents to manifest the objects manifested, in so far as the latter abide in them. A mirror, e. g., or a sheet of water, or a certain mass of matter, manifests a face or the disc of the moon (reflected in the mirror or water) or the generic character of a cow (impressed on the mass of matter) in so far as all those things abide in them.—In this way, then, there arises the erroneous view that finds expression in the judgment ‘I know.—Nor must you, in the way of objection, raise the question how self-luminous consciousness is to be manifested by the non-intelligent ahamkara, which rather is itself manifested by conscious- ness; for we observe that the surface of the hand, which itself is manifested by the rays of sunlight falling on it, at the same time manifests those rays. This is clearly seen in the case of rays passing through the interstices of net- work: the light ef those rays is intensified by the hand on which they fall, and which at the same time is itself manifested by the rays.

It thus appears that the ‘knowing agent,’ who is denoted by the ‘I,’ in the judgment ‘I know, constitutes no real

attribute of the Self; the nature of which is pure intelligence.

This is also the reason why the consciousness of Egoity

does not persist in the states of deep sleep and final release : in those states this special form of consciousness “passes away, and the Self appears in its true nature, i. e. as. pure, Consciousness. Hence a person who has risen from deep,

dreamless sleep reflects, ‘Just now I was unconscious of myself.

| Summing up ofethe pürvapaksha view. As the outcome of all this, we sum up our view as

follows.—E S.— Eternal, absolutely non-changing consciousness,

whos i i i i ; Ei nature ig pure non-differenced intelligence, free from a” distinction whatever, owing

itself (vivarttate) as broken up knowing Subjects, objects of kn

tó error illusorily manifests into manifold distinctions— owledge, acts of knowledge.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 29

And the purpose. for which we enter on the consideration of the Vedánta-texts is utterly to destroy what is the root of that error, i.e. Nescience, and thus to obtain a firm knowledge of the oneness of Brahman, whose nature is mere iritelligence—free, pure, eternal.

THE GREAT SIDDHANTA.

This entire theory rests on a fictitious foundation of altogether hollow and vicious arguments, incapable of being stated in definite logical alternatives, and devised by men who are destitute of those particular qualities which cause individuals to be chosen by the Supreme Person revealed in the Upanishads ; whose intellects are darkenéd by the impression of beginningless evil; and who thus have no insight into the nature of words and sentences, into the real purport conveyed by them, and into the procedure of sound argumentation, with all its methods depending on perception and the other instruments of right knowledge. The theory therefore must needs be rejected by all those who, through texts, perception and the other means of knowledge—assisted by sound reasoning—have an insight into the true nature of things.

There is no proof of non-differenced substance.

To enter into details.— Those wio maintain the doctrine of a substance devoid of all difference have no right to 'assert that this or that is a proof of such a substance; for all means of right knowledge have for their object things affected with difference.—Should any one, taking his'stand on the received views of his sect, assert that the theory of a substance free from all difference (does not require any further means of proof but) is, immediately established by ‘one’s own consciousness ; WC reply that he also is refuted by the fact, warranted by the witness of the Self, that all consciousness implies difference : all states of consciousness have for their object something that is marked by some dit- ference, as appears in the case of judgments like ‘ I saw this.’ And should a state of consciousness—although directly

40 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

apprehended as implying difference—be determined by soma fallacioys reasoning to be devoid of difference, this determi- nation could be effected only by means of some special at- tributes additional to the quality of mere Being ; and owing to these special qualities on which the determination depends, that state of consciousness would clearly again be character- ised by difference. The meaning of the mentioned deter- mination could thus only be that of a thing affected with certain differences some other differences are denied ; but manifestly this would not prove the existence of a thing free from all difference. To thought there at any rate belongs the quality of being thought and self-illuminatedness, for the knowing principle is observed to have for its essential nature the illumining (making to shine forth) of objects. And that also in the states of deep sleep, swoon, &c., con- sciousness is affected with difference we shall prove, in its proper place, in greater detail. Moreover you yourself admit that to consciousness there actually belong different attributes such as permanency (oneness, self-Iuminousness, &c.) and of these it cannot be shown that they are only Being in general And even if the latter point were admitted, we observe that there takes place different views, and you yourself attempt to prove your theory by means of the differences between those views and your own. It therefore must be admitted that reality

is affected with difference well established by valid means of proof. | l

a discussion of

Sabda proves difference. _ As to sound (speech ; sabda) |t possesses the power of denot affected with differenze, sentences. Now a word bination of a radical eleme elements have ‘different me the word itself can con difference, And further

1 ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 4I

denote a thing devoid of all difference.— The conclusion is that sound cannot be a means of knowledge for a thing devoid of all difference.

Pratyaksha—even of the nirvikalpaka kind— proves difference.

Perception in the next place—with its two subdivisions of non-determinate (nirvikalpaka) and determinate (savi- kalpaka) perception—also cannot be a means of knowledge for things devoid of difference. Determinate perception clearly has for its object things affected with difference ; for it relates to that which is distinguished by generic differ- ence and so on. But also non-determinate perception has for its object only what is marked with difference ; for it is on the basis of non-determinate perception that the object distinguished by generic character and so on is recognised in the act of determinate perception. Non-determinate perception is the apprehension of the object in so far as ` destitute of some differences but not of all difference. Apprehension of the latter kind is in the first place not observed ever to take place, and is in the second place impossible: for all apprehension by consciousness takes place by means of some distinction ‘This is such and such.' Nothing can be apprehended apart from some special feature of make or structure, as e.g. the triangularly shaped dewlap in the case of cows. The true distinction between non- determinate and determinate perception is that the former is the apprehension of the first individual among a number of things belonging to the same class, while the latter is the apprehension of the second, third, and so on, individuals. On the apprehension of the first individual .cow the per- ceiving person is not conscious of the fact that the special shape which constitutes the generic character of the class ‘cows’ extends to the present individual also; while this special consciousness arises in the case of the perception of the second and third cow. The perception of the second individual thus is ‘ determinate’ in so far as it is determined by a special attribute, viz. the extension, to the perception, of the generic character of a class—manifested in a certain

42 VEDANTA-SOTRAS.

outward shape—which connects this act of perception with the earlier perception (of the first individual) ; such deter- mination being ascertained only on the apprehension of the second individual. Such extension or continuance of a certain generic character is, on the other hand, n Jt appre- hended on the apprehension of the first individual, and perception of the latter kind thence is ‘ non-determinate. That it is such is not due to non-apprehension of struc- ture, colour, generic character. and soon, for all these attributes are equally objects of sensuous perception (and hence perceived as belonging to the first individual also). Moreover that which possesses structure cannot be perceived apart from the structure, and hence in the case of the apprehension of the first individual there is already perception of structure, giving rise to the judgment ' The thing is such and such.’ In the case of the second, third, &c., individuals, on the other hand, we apprehend, in addition to the thing possessing structure and to the structure itself, the special attribute of the persistence of the generic character, and hence the perception is 'deter- minate. From all this it follows that perception never has for its object that which is devoid of all difference.

The bhedábheda view is untenanle.

The same arguments tend to refute the view that there is difference and absence of difference at.the same time (the so-called bhedábheda view). Take the judgment * This is such and such’; how can we realise here the non-difference of “being this’ and ‘being such and such’? The ‘such and such’ denotes a peculiar make characterised, e. g. by a dewlap, the 'this' denotes the thing distinguished by that peculiar make; the non-differerice of these two is thus contradicted by immediate cónsciousness. At the outset the thing perceived is perceived as separate from all other things, and this separation is- founded on the fact that the thing is distinguished 'by a special constitution, let us say M Ra oce of a cow, expressed by the term E or E: Tn general, wherever we cognise the

inguishing attribute and thing distinguished

Hmm

I ADHYAYA, I PÁDA, I. 43

thereby, the two clearly present themselves to our mind as

absolutely different. Some things— c.g. staffs and bracelets —appear sometimes as having a separate, independent existence of their own ; at other times they present them- selves as distinguishing attributes of other things or beings (i.e. of the persons carrying staffs or wearing bracelets). Other entities— e. g. the generic character of cows—have a being only in so far as they constitute the form of substances, and thus always present themselves as distinguishing attri- butes of those substances. In both cases there is the same relation of distinguishing attribute and thing distinguished thereby, and these two are apprehended às absolutely different. The difference between the two classes of entities is only that staffs, bracelets, and ‘similar things are capable of being apprehended in. separation from other things, while the generic characteristics of a species are absolutely incapable thereof. The assertion, therefore, that the differ- ence of things is refuted by immediate consciousness, is based on the plain denial of a certain form of consciousness, the one namely—admitted by every one—which is expressed in the judgment ‘ This thing is such and such. —This same point is clearly expounded by the Sûtrakâra in II, 2, 33.

Inference also teaches difference.

Perception thus having for its object only what is marked by difference, inference also is in the same case; for its object is only what is distinguished by connexion with things known through perception and other meang of know- ledge. And thus, even in the case of disagreement as to the number of the different instruments of knowledge, a thing devoid of difference could not F . established by any of them since the instruments of knowledge acknowledged by all have only one and the sanfe object, viz. what is marked by difference. And a person who maintains the existence of a thing devoid of difference on the ground of differences affecting that very thing simply contradictg himself without knowing what he does; he is in fact no better than aman who asserts that his own mother never had any children.

44 VEDÁNTA-SÜTRAS.

Perception does not reveal mere Being.

In reply to the assertion that perception causes the apprehension of pure Being only, and therefore canno: have difference for its object; and that ‘difference cannot be "defined because it does not admit of being set forth in definite alternatives; we point out that these charges are completely refuted by the fact that the only objects of perception are things distinguished by generic character and so on, and that generic character and so on—as being relative things—give at once rise to the judgment as to the distinction between themselves and the things in which they inhere. You yourself admit that in the case of knowledge and in that of colour and other qualities this relation holds good, viz. that something which gives rise to a judgment ` about another thing at the same time gives rise to a judg- ment about itself; the same may therefore be admitted with regard to difference !.

For this reason the charge of a regressus in infinitum and a logical scesaw (see above, p. 32) cannot be upheld. For even if perceptive cognition takes place within one moment, we apprehend within that moment the generic character which constitutes on the one hand the difference of the thing from others, and on the other hand the peculiar character of the thing itself; and thus there remains nothing to be apprehended in a second moment.

Moreover, if perception made us apprehend only pure Being, judgments clearly referring to different objects—such as ‘Here is a jar, ‘There is a piece of cloth’—would be devoid of all meaning. And if through perception we did not apprehend difference—as marked by generic character, &c., constituting the structure or make of a thing—why should a man searching for a ‘horse not be satisfied with finding a buffalo? And if mere Being only were the object of all our cognitions, why should we not remember, = P ICT

! Colour reveals itself as well as the thing \that -has colour;

knowledge reveals itself as well as the object known; so difference manifests itself as well as the things that differ,

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 4

| CA

in the case of each particular cognition, all the words which are connected with all our cognitions? And further, if the cognition of a horse and that of an elephant had one object only, the later cognition would cause us to apprehend only what was apprehended before, and there being thus no difference (of object of cognition) there would be nothing to distinguish the later state of cognition from remembrance. If on the other hand a difference is admitted for each state of consciousness, we admit thereby that perception has for its objects things affected with difference.

If all acts of cognition had one and the same object only, everything would be apprehended by one act of cognition ; and from this it would follow that there are no persons » either deaf or blind!

Nor does, as a matter of fact, the eye apprehend mere Being only; for what it does apprehend is colour and the coloured thing, and those other qualities (viz. extension, &c.), which inhere in the thing together with colour. Nor does feeling do so; for it has for its objects things palp- able. Nor have the ear and the other senses mere Being for their object; but they relate to what is distinguished by a special sound or taste or smell. Hence there is not any source of knowledge causing us to apprehend mere Being. If moreover the senses had for their object mere Being free from all difference, it would follow that Scripture which has the same object would (not be originative of knowledge but) perform the function of a mere anuváda, i.e. it would merely make statements about something, the knowledge of which is already established by some other means. And further, according to your own doctrine, mere Being, i. e. Brahman, would hold the position of an object with regard to the instruments of knewledge; and thus there would cling to it all the imperfections indicated by yourself—non- intelligent nature, perishableness and so on.—From all this we conclude that perception has for its object only what is distinguished by difference manifesting itself in generic character and so on, which constitute the make or structure of a thing. (That the generic character of a thing is nothing else but its particular structure follows) from the

o

46 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

fact that we do not perccive anything. different from structure, which could be claimed as constituting the object of the cognition that several individuals possess one and the same general form. And as our theory sufficiently accounts for the ordinary notions as to generic character, and as morcover even those who hold generic character to be something different from structure admit that there is such a thing as (common) structure, we adhere to the conclusion that generic character is nothing but structure. By ‘structure’ we understand special or distinctive form ; and we acknowledge different forms of that kind according to ‘the different classes of things. And as the current judgments as to things being different from one another can be explained on the basis of the apprehension of generic character, and as no additional entity is observed to exist, and as even those who maintain the existence of such an additional thing admit the existence of gencric character, we further conclude that difference (bheda) is nothing but generic character (gáti).— But if this were so, the judgment as to difference would immediately follow from the judgment as to generic character, as soon as the latter is apprehended !— Quite true, we reply. Asa matter of fact the judgment of difference is immediately formulated on the basis of the judgment as to generic character. For ‘the generic character ' of a cow, e.g.. means just the exclusion of everything else : as soon as that character is apprehended all thought and speech referring to other creatures belonging to the same wider genus (which includes buffaloes and so on also) come to an

end. It is through the apprehension of difference only that the idea of non-difference comes to an end.

Plurality is not unreal.

Next as to thc assertion that all difference presented in our cognition—as of jars, pieces of cloth and the like—is unreal because such difference does not persist. This view we maintain, is altogether erroneous, springs in fact Ean the neglect of distinguishing between persistence and non- persistence on the one hand, and the relation between what sublates and what is sublated on the other hand.. Where

I ADHYÁYA, I PADA, I. 47

two cognitions are mutually contradictory, there the latter relation holds good, and there is non-persistence of what is sublated. But jars, pieces of cloth and the like, do not contradict one another, since they are separate in place and time. If on the other hand the non-cxistence of a thing is cognised at the same time and the same place where and when its existence is cognised, we have a mutual contra- diction of two cognitions, and then the stronger onc sublates the other cognition which thus comes to an end. But when of a thing that is perceived in connexion with some place and time, the non-existence is perceived in connexion with some other place and time, there arises no contradiction; how then’ should the one cognition sublate the other? or how can it be said that of a thing absent at one time and place there is absence at other times and places also? In the case of the snake-rope, there arises a cognition of non-existence in connexion with the given place and time; hence there is contradiction, one judgment sublates the other and the sublated cognition comes tó an end. But the circumstance of something. which is seen at one time and in one place not persisting at another time and in another place is not observed to be invariably accompanied by falsehood, and hence mere non- persistence of this kind does not constitute a reason for unreality. To say, on the other hand, that what is is real because it persists, is to prove what is proved already, and requires no further proof.

Being and Consciousness are not one.

Hence mere Being does not alone constitute reality. And as the distinction between consciousness and its objects —which rests just on this relation of object and that for _which the object is—is proved’ by perception, the assertion that only consciousness has real existence is also dis- posed of.

The true meaning of Svayamprakasatva. We next take up the point as to the self-Iuminousness of consciousness (above, p. 33). The contention that conscious- ness is not an object holds good for the knowing Self at the

46 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. ee —— fact that we do not perccive anything. different from structure, which could be claimed as constituting the object of the cognition that several individuals possess one and the same general form. And as our theory sufficiently accounts for the ordinary notions as to generic character, and as morcover even those who hold generic character to be something different from structure admit that there is such a thing as (common) structure, we adhere to the - conclusion that generic character is nothing but structure. By ‘structure’ we understand special or distinctive form ; and we acknowledge different forms of that kind according to ‘the different classes of things. And as the current judgments as to things being different from one another can be explained on the basis of the apprehension of generic character, and as no additional entity is observed to exist, and as even those who maintain the existence of such an additional thing admit the existence of generic character, we further conclude that difference (bheda) is nothing but generic character (gáti).— But if this were so, the judgment as to difference would immediately follow from the judgment as to generic character, as soon as the latter is apprehended !— Quite true, we reply. As a matter of fact the judgment of difference is immediately formulated on the basis of the judgment as to generic character. For ‘the generic character ' of a cow, e.g.. means just the exclusion of everything else : as soon as that character is apprehended all thought and speech referring to other creatures belonging to the same wider genus (which includes buffaloes and so on also) come to an

end. It is through the apprchension of difference only that the idea of non-difference comes to an end.

Plurality is not unreal.

Next as to the assertion that all difference presented in our cognition—as of jars, pieces of cloth and the like—is unreal becausc such difference does not persist. This view we maintain, is altogether erroneous, springs in fact fom the neglect of distinguishing between persistence and non- persistence on the one hand, and the relation between what sublates and what is sublated on the other hand.. Where

I ADHYÁYA, I PÁDA, I. 47

—— P Áo. two cognitions are mutually contradictory, there the latter relation holds good, and there is non-persistence of what is sublated. But jars, pieces of cloth and the like, do not contradict one another, since they are separate in place and time. If on the other hand the non-cxistence of a thing is cognised at the same time and the same place where and when its existence is cognised, we have a mutual contra- diction of two cognitions, and then the stronger one sublates the other cognition which thus comes to an end. But when of a thing that is perceived in connexion with some place and time, the non-existence is perceived in connexion with some other place and time, there arises no contradiction; how then’ should the one cognition sublate the other? or how can it be said that of a thing absent at one time and place there is absence at other times and places also? In the case of the snake-rope, there arises a cognition of non-existence in connexion with the given place and time; hence there is contradiction, one judgment sublates the other and the sublated cognition comes tó an end. But the circumstance of something. which is seen at one time and in one place not persisting at another time and in another place is not observed to be invariably accompanied by falschood, and hence mere non- persistence of this kind does not constitute a reason for unreality. To say, on the other hand, that what is is real because it persists, is to prove what is proved already, and requires no further proof.

Being and Conseiousness are not one.

Hence mere Being does not alone constitute reality. And as the distinction between consciousness and its objects —which rests just on this relation of object and that for which the object is—is proved’ by perception, the assertion that only consciousness has real existence is also dis- posed of.

The true meaning of Svayamprakásatva. We next take up the point as to the selfzIuminousness of consciousness (above, p. 33). The contention that conscious- ness is not an object holds good for the knowing Self at the

48 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. edu Lu ——

EEUU

time when it illumines (i. e. constitutes as its objects) other things; but there is no absolute rule as to all consciousness never being anything but self-luminous. For common observation shows that the consciousness of one person may become the object of the cognition of another, viz. of an inference founded on the person's friendly or unfriendly appearance and the like, and again that a person's own past states of consciousness become the object of his own cognition—as appears from judgments such as * At one time I knew.’ -It cannot therefore be said ‘If it is con- sciousness it is self-proved' (above, p. 33), nor that con- sciousness if becoming an object of consciousness would no longer be consciousness ; for from this it would follow that one's own past states, and the conscious states of others— because being objects of consciousness—are not themselves consciousness. Moreover, unless it were admitted that there is inferential knowledge of the thoughts of others, there would be no'apprehension of the connexion of words and meaning, and this would imply the absolute termination of all human intercourse depending on speech. Nor also would it be possible for pupils to attach themselves to a teacher of sacred lore, for the reason that they had-become aware of his wisdom and learning. "The general proposition that consciousness does not admit of being an object is in fact quite untenable. 'The essential nature of consciousness— or knowledge — consists therein that it shines forth, or manifests itself, through its own being to its own substrate at the present moment ; or (to give another definition) that

it is instrumental in proving its own object by its own being !.

—

i The comment ot the Sru. Pra. on the above definitions runs, with a few additional explanations, as follows: The term ‘anu- byati’ here denotes knowledge in general, not only such know- ledge as is not remembrance (which limited meaning the term has sometimes). With reference to the ‘shining forth’ it might be said that in this way jars also and similar things know or e conscious because they also ‘shine forth’ (viz. in D far as they are known); to exclude jars and the like the text'therefore adds ‘to its own substrate’ (the jar ‘shines forth; not to itself, but to the

E OSSE

I ADHYAYA, I PÁDA, I. — 49 BEENDEN v vcv— Now these two characteristics are established by a person's Own state of consciousness and do not vanish when that consciousness becomes the object of another state of consciousness; consciousness remains also in the latter case what it is. Jars and similar things, on the other hand, do not possess consciousness, not because they are objects of consciousness but because they lack the two characteristics stated above. If we made the presence of consciousness dependent on the absence of its being an object of consciousness, we should arrive at the conclusion een knowing përson). There are other attributes of the Self, such as atomic extension, eternity, and so on, which are revealed (not through themselves) but through an act of knowledge different from them; to exclude those the text adds 'through its own being.’ In order to exclude past states of consciousness or acts of knowledge, the iext adds *at the present moment. A past state of consciousness is indeed not revealed without another act of knowledge (representing it), and would thus by itself be excluded ; but the text adds this specification (viz. *at the present moment ) on purpose, in order to intimate that a past state of consciousness can be represented by another state—a point denied by the oppo- nent. ‘At the present moment’ means ‘the connexion with the object of knowledge belonging to the present time.’ Without the addition of ‘to its own substrate’ the definition might imply that a state of consciousness is manifest to another person also; to exclude this the clause is added. This first definition might be objected to as acceptable only to those who maintain the svayazz- prakásatva-theory (which need not be discussed here); hence a second definition is given. The two clauses ‘to its own substrate’ and ‘at the present moment’ have to be supplied in this second definition also. ‘Instrumental in bringing about’ would apply to staffs, wheels, and such like implements als. ; hence the text adds ‘its own object.’ (Staffs, wheels, &c. have no ‘objects.’) Know- ledge depénding on sight does not bring about an object depending on hearing ;-to exclude this hotion of universal instrumentality the text specifies the object by the words ‘its own. The clause ‘through its own being’ excludes the sense organs, which reveal objects not by their. own being, but in so far as they give rise to knowledge. The two clauses ‘at the present moment’ and ‘to its own substrate’ have the same office in the second definition as in the first.

[48] UE

50 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. Soo EE that consciousness is. not consciousness ; for there are things —e. g. sky-flowers—which are not objects of consciousness and.at the same time are not consciousness. You will perhaps reply to this that a sky-flower's not being con- sciousness is due not to its not being an object of conscious- ness, but to its non-existence !—Well then, we rejoin, let us say analogously that the reason of jars and the like not being contradictory to Nescience (i. e. of their being gada), is their not being of the nature of consciousness, and let us not have recourse to their being objects of consciousness !— But if consciousness is an object-of consciousness, we con- clude that it also is non-contradictory of Nescience, like a jar'—At this conclusion, we rejoin, you may arrive even on the opposite assumption, reasoning as follows: * Con- sciousness is non-contradictory of Nescience, because it is not an Object of consciousness, like a sky-flower! All which shows that to maintain as a general principle that something which is an object of consciousness cannot itself be consciousness is simply ridiculous.’ |

Cousciousngss is not eternal.

It was further maintained by the pürvapakshin that as Consciousness is self-established it has no antecedent non- existence and so on, and that this disproves its having an origin. But this is an attempt to prove something not proved by something else that is equally unproved ; com- parable to a man blind from birth undertaking to guide another blind man! You have no right to maintain the non-existence of the antecedent non-existence of conscious- ness on the ground that there is nothing to make us apprehend that non-existence; for there is something to make us apprehend it, viz. consciousness itself !—But on can consciousness at the time when it is, make us apprehend Ks own previous non-existence which is contradictorily opposed to if ?— Consciousness, we rejoin, does not neces- sarily constitute as its objects only what occupies the same ey with itself; were it so it would follow that neither d ^uo cr NR px d the object of consciousness.

IS an absolute rule that the

oo `

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. Sal = antecedent non-existence of consciousness, if proved, must be contemporaneous with consciousness? Have you then, we ask, ever observed this so as to be able to. assert an absolute rule? And if it were observed, that would prove the existence of previous non-existence, not its negation !— The fact, however, is that no person in his senses will maintain the contemporaneous existence of consciousness and its own antecedent non-existence. In the case of per- zeptive knowledge originating from sensation, there is indeed this limitation, that it causes the apprehension of such things only as are actually present at the same time. But this limitation does not extend to cognitions of all kinds, nor to all instruments of knowledge; for we observe that remembrance, inference, and the magical perception of Yogis apprehend such things also as are not present at the time of apprehension. On this very point there rests the relation connecting the means of knowledge with their objects, viz. that the former are not without the latter. This does not mean that the instrument of knowledge is connected with its object in that way that it is not without something that is present at the time of cognition; but rather that the instrument of knowledge is opposed to the falsehood of that special form in which the object presents itself as connected with some place and time.— This dis- poses also of the contention that remembrance has no external object; for it is: observed that remembrance is related to such things also as have perished.—Possibly you will now argue as follows. The antecedent non-existence of consciousness cannot be ascertained by perception, for it is not something present at the time of perception. It further cannot be ascertained by the other means of know- ledge, since there is no characteristic mark (linga) on which an inference could be based: for we do not observe any characteristic mark invariably acéompanied by the ante- cedent non-existence of consciousness. . Nor do we meet with any scriptural text referring to this antecedent non- existence. Hence, in the absence of any valid instrument of knowledge, the antecedent ‘non-existence of consciousness. cannot be established at all.—If, we reply, you thus.

RID

52 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. altogether setting aside the force of ‘self-provedness (on which you had relied hitherto), take your stand on the absence of valid means of knowledge, we again must request you to give in; for there is a valid means of knowledge whereby to prove the antecedent non-existence of consciousness, viz. valid non-perception (enupalabdhi). Moreover, we observe that perceptional knowledge proves its object, be it a Jar or something else, to exist only as long as it exists itself, not at all times; we do not, through it, apprehend the antecedent or subsequent existence of the jar. Now this absence of apprehension is due to the fact that consciousness itself is limited in time. If that consciousness which has a jar for its object were itself appre- hended as non-limited in time, the object also—the jar— would be apprehended under the same form, i.e. it would | be eternal. And if self-established consciousness were | eternal, it would be immediately cognised as eternal ; but | this is not the case. Analogously, if inferential conscious- | ness and other forms of consciousness were apprehended as | non-limited in time, they would all of them reveal their | objects also as non-limited, and these objects would thus be eternal; for the objects are conform in nature to their respective forms of consciousness.

There is no Consciousness without object.

Nor is there any consciousness devoid of objects; for nothing of this kind is ever known. Moreover, the self- luminousness of consciousness has, by our opponent him- self, been proved on the ground that its essential nature consists in illumining (revealing) objects; the self-luminous ness of consciousness not admitting of proof apart from its

essential nature which consists in the lighting up of objects: | And as moreover, according to our opponent, consciousness cannot be the object of another consciousness, it woul follow that (having neither an object nor itself being afii object) it is something altogether unreal, imaginary. : |

Nor are you justified in maintaining that in deep sleep | swoon, senselessness and similar states, pure consciousness: devoid of any object, manifests itself. This view is neg?

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, T. 53

tived by ‘valid non-perception' (see above, p. 52). If consciousness Were present in those states also, there would be remembrance of it at the time of waking from sleep or recovery frou Swoon; but as a matter of fact there is no such remembrance.—But it is not an absolute rule that something of which we were conscious must be remem- bered; how then can the absence of remembrance prove the absence of previous consciousness ?— Unless, we reply, . there be some cause of overpowering strength which quité obliterates all impressions—as e.g. the dissolution of the body—the absence of remembrance does necessarily prove the absence of previous consciousness. And, moreover, in the present case the absence of consciousness does not only follow from absence of remembrance ; it is also proved by the thought presenting itself to the person risen from sleep, : For so long a time I was not conscious of anything. —Nor may it be said that even if there was consciousness, absence of remembrance would necessarily follow from the absence (during deep sleep) of the distinction of objects, and from the extinction of the consciousness of the ' I’; for the non- consciousness of some one thing, and the absence of some one thing cannot be the cause of the non-remembrance of some other thing, of which there had been consciousness. And that in the states in question the consciousness of the ‘I?’ does persist, will moreover be shown further on..

But, our opponent urges, have you not said yourself that even in deep sleep and similar states there is consciousness marked by difference ?— True, we have said so. But that consciousness is consciousness of the Self, and that this is affected by difference will be proved further on. At present we are only interested in denying the existence of your pure consciousness, devoid of all objects and without a substrate, Nor can we admit that your pure consciousness could constitute what we call the consciousness of the Self ; for we shall prove that the latter has a substrate.

It thus cannot be maintained that the antecedent non- existence of consciousness does not admit of being proved, because consciousness itself does not prove it. And as we have shown that consciousness itself may be an object of

54 |. VEDÁNTA-SÜTRAS.

consciousness, we have thereby disproved the alleged impossibility of antecedent non-existence being proved by other means. Herewith falls the assertion that the non- origination of consciousness can be proved.

Consciousness is capable of change.

Against the assertion that the alleged non-origination, of consciovsness at. the same time proves that consciousness is not capable of any other changes (p.. 36), we remark that the general proposition on which this conclusion rests is too wide: it would extend to antecedent non-existence itself, of which it is evident that it comes to an end, although it does not originate. In qualifying the changes as changes of ‘Being,’ you manifest great logical acumen indeed! For according to your own view Nescience also (which is not ‘ Being ") does not originate, is the substrate of manifold changes, and comes to an end through the rise of knowledge! Perhaps you will say that the changes of Nescience are all unreal. But, do you then, we ask in reply; admit that any change is real? You do not; and yet it is only this admission which would give a sense to the distinction expressed by the word ‘Being 1

Nor is it true that consciousness does not admit of any division within itself, because it has no beginning (p. 36). For the non-originated Self is divided. from the body, the senses, &c., and Nescience also, which is avowedly without a beginning, must needs be admitted to be divided from. the Self. And if you say that the latter division is unreal, -we ask whether you have ever observed a real division invariably connected with origination ! Moreover, if the distinction of Nescience from the Self is not real, it follows that Nescience and the Self are essentially one. You further have yourself proved the difference of views by | means of the difference of the objects of knowledge as established by non-refuted knowledge ; an analogous case

U—————— EE NE

! The Sankara is-not entitled t

and unreal division, because ac is unreal, |

o refer to a distinction of real cording to his theory all distinction

ERE

I ADHYAYA, I PÁDA, I. 55

being furnished by the difference of acts of cleaving, which results from the difference of objects to be cleft. And if you assert that of this knowing—which is essentially knowing only—nothing that is an object of knowledge can be an attribute, and that these objects—just because they are objects of knowledge—cannot be attributes of knowing ; we point out that both these remarks would apply also to eternity, self-luminousness, and the other attributes of 'knowing, which are acknowledged by yourself, and esta- blished by valid means of proof. Nor may you urge against this that all these alleged attributes are in reality mere ‘consciousness’ or ‘knowing’; for they are essentially distinct. By ‘being conscious’ or ‘knowing, we under- stand the illumining or manifesting of some object to its own' substrate (i. e. the substrate of knowledge), by its own existence (i. e. the existence of knowledge) merely ; by self- luminousness (or ‘self-illuminatedness’) we understand the shining forth or being manifest by its own existence merely to its own substrate; the terms ‘shining forth,’ * illumining;' ‘being manifest’ in both these definitions meaning the capability of becoming an object of thought and speech which is common to all things, whether intelligent or non- intelligent. Eternity again means ‘being present in all time’; oneness means ‘being defined by the number one.’ Even if you say that these attributes are only negative ones, i.e. equal to the absence of non-intelligence and so on, you still cannot avoid the admission that they are attributes of consciousness. If, on the other hand, being of a nature opposite to non-intelligence and so on, be not admitted as attributes of consciousness — whether of a positive or a negative kind —in addition to its essential nature; it is an altogether unmeaning proceeding to deny to it such qualities, as non-intelligence and the like. . We moreover must admit the following alternative : consciousness is either proved (established) or not. If it is proved it follows that it possesses attributes ; if it is not, it is something absolutely nugatory, like a sky-flower, and

similar purely imaginary things.

56 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. aE eee

Consciousness is the attribute of a permanent ‘Conscious Self.

Let it tnen be said that consciousness 1s proof (siddhi) itself. Proof of what, we ask in reply, and to whom ? If no definite answer can be given to these two questions, consciousness cannot be defined as ‘proof’; for ‘proof’ is a relative notion, like ‘son.’ You will perhaps reply ‘Proof to the Self’; and if we go on asking ‘But what is that Self’? you will say, ‘Just consciousness as already said by us before. True, we reply, you said so; but it certainly was not well said. For if it is the nature of consciousness to be ‘proof’ (‘light,’ ‘enlightenment ’) on the part of a person with regard to something, how can this consciousness which is thus connected with the person and the thing be itself conscious of itself? To explain: the essential character of consciousness or knowledge is that by its very :xistence it renders things capable of becoming objects, to its own substrate, of thought and speech. This conscious- ness (anubhüti) which is also termed g#Ana, avagati, savid, isa particular attribute belonging to a conscious Self and related to an object: as such it is known to every one on the testimony of his own Self—as appears from ordinary judgments such as ‘I know the jar,’ ‘I understand this matter; * I am conscious of (the presence of) this piece of cloth. That such is the essential nature of conscious- ness you yourself admit ; for you have proved thereby its self-luminousness. Of this consciousness which thus clearly presents itself-as the attribute of an agent and as related to an object, it would be difficult indeed to prove that at the same time it is itself the agent; as difficult as it would be to prove that the object of action is the agent.

For we cleaily see that this agent (the subject of con- sciousness) is permanent (constant), while its attribute, i.e. consciousness, not differing herein .from joy, grief, and the like, rises, persists for some time, and then comes to an end. Ta cy of PA conscious subject is proved by the BE Lender È on, this very same thing was formerly

y me.’ The non-permanency of conscious-

= A Se

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 57

ence ee Lue co

ness, on the other hand, is proved by thought expressing itself in the following forms, ‘I know at present, ‘I knew at a time, ‘I, the knowing subject, no longet have know- ledge of this thing. How then should consciousness and the conscious subject be one? If consciousness which changes every moment were admitted to constitute the conscious subject, it would be impossible for us to recognise the thing seen to-day as the one we saw yesterday ; for what has been perceived by one cannot be recognised by another. And even if consciousness were identified with the conscious subject and acknowledged as permanent, this would no better account for the fact of recognition. For recognition implies a conscious subject persisting from the earlier to the later moment, and not merely consciousness. Its expression is ‘/ myself perceived this thing on a former occasion.’ According to your view the quality of being a conscious agent cannot at all belong to consciousness ; for consciousness, you say, is just consciousness and nothing more. And that there exists a pure consciousness devoid of substrate and objects alike, we have already refuted on the ground that of a thing of this kind we have absolutely no knowledge. And that the consciousness admitted by both of us should be the Self is refuted by immediate consciousness itself. And we have also refuted the falla- cious arguments brought forward to prove that mere consciousness is the only reality.—But, another objection is raised, should the relation of the Self and the ‘I’ not rather be conceived as follows :—In _ self-consciousness which expresses itself in the judgment ‘I know, that intel- ligent something which constitutes the absolutely non- objective element, and is pure homogeneous light, is the Self; the objective element (yushmad-artha) on the other hand, which is established through its being illumined (revealed) by the Self is the /—in SI know '—and this is something different from pure intelligence, something objective or external ?

By no means, we reply; for uus view cuucraaicts the relation of attribute and substrate of attribute of which we are directly conscious, as implied in the thought ‘I know.

58 VEDÁNTA-SÜTRAS.

Consider also what follows.—‘ If the Z were not the Self, the inwardness of the Self would not exist; for it is just the consciousness of the Z which separates the inward from the outward.

‘“May I, freeing myself from all pain, enter on free possession of endless delight?" This is the thought which prompts the man desirous of release to apply himself to the study of the sacred texts. Were it a settled matter that release consists in the annihilation of the I, the same man would move away as soon as release were only hinted at. "When I myself have perished, there still persists some consciousness different from me;" to bring this about nobody truly will exert himself.

* Moreover the very existence of consciousness, its being a consciousness at all, and its being self-luminous, depend on its connexion with a Self; when that connexion is dis- solved, consciousness itself cannot be established, not any more than the act of cutting can take place when there is no person to cut and nothing to be cut. Hence it is certain that the I, i.e. the knowing subject, is the inward Self.’

This scripture confirms when saying ‘By what should he know the knower?’ (Brz. Up. II, 4, I5); and Smriti also, ‘Him who knows this they call the knower of the body ' (Bha. Gi. XIII, 1). And the Sütrakára also, in the section beginning with * Not the Self on account of scripturai statement ' (IT, 5, 17), will say ‘For this very reason (it is)

a knower' (II, 3, 18); and from this it follows that the Self is not mere consciousness.

What is established by consciousness of the ‘T’ I itself, while the not-I is given in the consciousness of the not-I; hence to say that the knowing subject, which is

in mother or can 1t be said that this SEENE knowing subject, is dependent on its light for something

else. It rather is self-luminous ; for to be self-luminous one’s essential nature, sential nature does not DEaelse Mhe case e

ME S

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 259 analogous to that of the flame of a lamp or candle. From the circumstance that the lamp illumines with its light other things, it does not follow either that it is not luminous, or that. its luminousness depends on something else; the fact rather is that the lamp being of luminous nature shines itself and illumines with its light other things also. To explain.— The one substance tegas, i.e. fire or heat, subsists in a double form, viz. as light (prabhá), and as luminous matter. Although light is a quality of luminous substantial things; it is in itself nothing but the substance tegas, not a mere quality like e.g. whiteness ; for it exists

also apart from its substrates, and possesses colour (which

is a quality). Having thus attributes different from those of qualities such as whiteness and so on, and possessing illumining power, it is the substance tegas, not anything else (e.g. a quality). Illumining power belongs to it, because it lights up itself and other things. At the same time it is practically treated as a quality because it always

has the substance tegas for its substrate, and depends on

it. This must not be objected to on the ground that what is called light is really nothing but dissolving particles of matter which proceed from the substance tegas; for if this were so, shining gems and the sun would: in the end consume themselves completely. Moreover, if the flame of a lamp consisted of dissolving particles of matter, it would never be apprehended as a whole ; for no reason can be stated why those particles should regularly rise in an agglomerated form to the height of four fingers’ breadth, and after that simultaneously disperse themselves uniformly in all directions—upwards, sideways, and down- wards. The fact is that the flame of the lamp together with its light is produced anew every moment and again vanishes every moment; as we may infer from the succes- sive combination of sufficient causes (viz. particles of oil and wick) and from its coming to an end when those causes are completely consumed. |

Analogously to the lamp, the Self is essentially intelli- gent (£id-rüpa), and has intelligence. (£aitanya) for its quality. And to be essentially intelligent means to be

60 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

7 ee eeeeeeeeeeSSSOOONCSONNNN. self-luminous. There are many scriptural texts declaring this compare e.g. ‘As a mass of salt has neither inside nor ee but is altogether a mass of taste, thus indeed that Self has neither inside nor outside but is altogether a n of knowledge’ (Bri. Up. IV, 6, 12); ‘There that person becomes self-luminous, there is no destruction of the know- ing of the knower’ (Bri. Up. MV oiTa; 30); “ite who knows, let me smell this, he is the Self’ (7. Up VILL, 12, 4); ‘Who, is that Self? That one who is made of know- ledge, among the prázas, within the heart, the light, the person’ (Bzz. Up. IV, 3, 7); ‘For it is he who sees, hears, smells, tastes, thinks, considers, acts, the person whose Self is knowledge’ (Pr. Up. IV, 9); ‘Whereby should one know the knower’ (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15). ‘This person knows, ‘ The seer does not see death nor illness nor pain’ (Kh. Up. VIII, 26, 2); ‘That highest person not remem- bering this body into which he was born’ (K4. Up. VIII, 12, 3) ; ‘ Thus these sixteen parts of the spectator that go towards the person ; when they have reached the person, sink into him’ (Pr. Up. VI, 5); ‘From this consisting of mind, there is different an interior Self consisting of knowledge’ (Taitt. Up. II, 4). And the Sütrakára also will refer to the Self as a * knower' in II, 3, 18. All which shows that the self-luminous Self is a knower, i. e. a knowing subject, and not pure light (non-personal intelligence). In general we may say that where there is light it must belong to some-

thing, as shown by the light of a lamp. The Self thus cannot be mere consciousness.

———

The grammarians moreover tell us that words such as ‘consciousness,’ ‘ knowledge,’ &c., are relative; neither ordinary nor Vedic language uses expressions such as ‘he knows’ without reference to an object known and an agent who knows.

With reference to the assertion that consciousness con- stitutes the Self, because it (consciousness) is not non- intelligent (gada), we ask what you understand by this ‘absence of non-intelligence’ If you reply ' luminousness due to the being of the thing itself (i. e. of the thing which ts agada)’; we point out that this definition would wrongly include lamps also, and similar things; and it would su

I ADHYAYA, I PÁDA, I. 61

over give rise to a contradiction, since you do not admit light as an attribute, different from consciousness itself. Nor can we allow you to define agadatva as ' being of that nature that light is always present, without any exception, ‘for this definition would extend also to pleasure, pain, and similar states. Should you maintain that pleasure and so on, although being throughout of the nature of light, are non- intelligent for the reason that, like jars, &c., they shine forth (appear) to something else and hence belong to the sphere of the not-Self; we ask in reply: Do you mean then to say that knowledge appears to itself? Knowledge no less than pleasure appears to some one else, viz. the ‘I’: there is, in that respect, no difference between the judgment «T know,’ and the judgment ‘I am pleased. Non-intelli- gence in the sense of appearingness-to-itself is thus not proved for consciousness ; arid hence it follows that what constitutes the Self is the non-gada ‘I’ which is proved to itself by its very Being. That knowledge is of the nature of light depends altogether’ on its connexion with the knowing ‘1’: it is due to the latter, that knowledge, like pleasure, manifests itself to that conscious person who is its substrate, and not to anybody else. The Self is thus not mere knowledge, but is the knowing ‘I.’

The view that the conscious subject is something unreal, due to the ahamkéra, cannot be maintained.

We turn to a further point. You maintain that con- sciousness. which is in reality devoid alike of objects and substrate presents itself, owing to error, in the form of a knowing subject, just as mother o' pearl appears as silver ; (consciousness itself being viewed as a real substrate of an erroneous imputation), ‘because an erroneous imputation cannot take place apart from a substrate. But this theory is indefensible. If things were as you describe them, the conscious ‘I’ would be cognised as co-ordinate with the state of consciousness ‘J am consciousness, just as the shining thing presenting itself to our eyes is judged to be silver. But the fact is that the state of consciousness

presents itself as something apart, constituting a distin-

62 VEDANTA-SOTRAS. |

guishing attribute of the I, just as the Stick is an attribute of Devadatta who carries it. The judgment ‘I am con- ` scious’ reveals an * I? distinguished by consciousness; and to declare that it refers only to a state of consciousness — which is a mere attribute—is no better than to say that the judgment ‘Devadatta carries a stick’ is about the stick only. Nor are you right in Saying that the idea of the Self being a knowing agent, presents itself to the mind of him only who erroneously identifies the Self and the body, an error expressing itself in judgments such as ‘I am stout,’ and is on that account false; for from this-it would follow that the consciousness which is erroneously imagined as a Self is also false; for it presents itself to the mind ‘of the same. person. You will perhaps rejoin that consciousness is not false because it (alone) is not sublated by that cognition which sublates everything else. Well, we reply, then the knowership of the Self also is not false; for that also is not sublated. You further maintain that the

intelligent kind (gada), and residing in the ahamkara which is the abode of change and a mere effect of the Unevolved

the body, not a real Self but something external and non- intelligent, But all this is unfounded, since the internal]

Same reason the ahazzkára also—

the body—is aZkára is no more

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 63

a knower than it is something subjective ; otherwise there would be an evident contradiction. As knowing cannot be attributed to the ahamkara, which is an object of know- ledge, so knowership also cannot be ascribed to it; for of that also it is the object. Nor can it be maintained that to be a knower is something essentially changing. For to be a knower is to be the substrate of the quality of know- ledge, and as the knowing Self is eternal, knowledge which is an essential quality of the Self is also eternal. That the Self is eternal will be declared in the Sütra, II, 3, 17 ; and in II, 3, 18 the term ‘g#a’ (knower) will show that it is an essential quality of the Self to be the abode of knowledge. That a Self whose essential nature is knowledge should be the substrate of the (quality of) knowledge—-just as gems and the like are the substrate of light—gives rise to no contradiction whatever. |

Knowledge (the quality) which is in itself unlimited, is capable of contraction and expansion, as we shall show later on. In the so-called kshetragZa-condition of the Self, knowledge is, owing to the influence of work (karman), of a contracted nature, as it more or less adapts itself to work of different kinds, and is variously determined by the different senses. With reference to this various flow of knowledge as due to the senses, it is spoken of as rising and setting, and the Self possesses the quality of an agent. As this quality is not, however, essential, but originated by action, thé Self is essentially unchanging. This changeful quality of being a knower can belong only to the Self whose essential nature is knowledge; not possibly to the non-intelligent ahamkara. But, you will perhaps say, the 'ahazzkára, although of non-intelligent nature, may become a knower in so far as by approximation to intelligence it becomes a reflection of the latter. How, we ask in return, is this becoming a reflection of intelligence imagined to take place? Does consciousness become a reflection of the ahamkara, or does the ahamkara become a reflection of consciousness? The former alternative is inadmissible, since you will not allow to consciousness the quality of being a knower; and so is the latter since, as explained

64 VEDÁNTA-SÜTRAS.

above, the non-intelligent aha;zekára can never psu a knower. Moreover, neither consciousness nor the ahazzkára are objects of visual perception. "Only pale seen by the eye have reflections.—Let it then be said that as an iron ball is heated by contact with fire, so the consciousiess of being a knower is imparted to the ahamkara through its contact with Intelligence.— This view too is inadmissible ; for as you do not allow real knowership to Intelligence, knowership or the consciousness of knowership cannot be imparted to the aha;z;kára by contact with Intelligence ; and much less even can knowership or the consciousness of it be imparted to Intelligence by contact with the essen- tially non-intelligent ahazzkára. Nor can we accept what you say about * manifestation! Neither the ahaz/kára, you say, nor Intelligence is really a knowing subject, but the ahaz;kára manifests consciousness abiding within itself (within the ahaz;/kára) as the mirror manifests the image abiding within it. But the essentially non-intelligent ahamkara evidently cannot ‘manifest’ the self-luminous Self. As has been said ‘That the non-intelligent ahazzkára should manifest the self-luminous Self, has no more sense than to say that a spent coal manifests the Sun. The truth is that all things depend for their proof on self- luminous consciousness; and now you maintain that one of these things, viz. the non-intelligent ahazzkára— which itself depends for its light on consciousness—manifests con- sciousness, whose essential light never rises or sets, and which is the cause that proves everything! Whoever knows the nature of the Self will justly deride such a view! The relation of ‘manifestation’ cannot hold good between consciousness and the ahaz;kára for the further reason also that there is a contradiction in nature between the two, and because it would imply consciousness not to be conscious- ness. As has been said, ‘One cannot manifest the other, owing to contradictor iness ; and if the Self were something to be manifested, that would imply its being non-intelligent like a jar’ Nor is the matter improved by your intro- ducing the hand and the sunbeams (above, p. 38), and to say that as the sunbeams, while manifesting the hand, are at the

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 65

same time manifested by the hand, so consciousness, while manifesting the ahaszkara, is at the same time itself mani- fested by the latter. The sunbeams are in reality not manifested by the hand at all. What takes place is that the motion of the sunbeams is reversed {reflected) by the opposed hand; they thus become more numerous, and hence are perceived more clearly; but this is due alto- gether to the multitude of beams, not to any manifesting power on the part of the hand.

What could, moreover, be the nature of that ‘ manifes- tation’ of the Self consisting of Intelligence, which would be effected through the ahaz;kára? It cannot be origin- ation; for you acknowledge that what is self-established cannot be originated by anything else. Nor can it be ‘illumination’ (making to shine forth), since consciousness cannot—according to you—be the object of another con- sciousness. For the same reason it cannot be any action assisting the means of being conscious of consciousness. For such helpful action could be of two kinds only. .It would either be such as to cause the connexion of the object to be known with the sense-organs; as e.g. any action which, in the case of the apprehension of a species or of one's own face, causes connexion between the organ of sight and an individual of the species, or a looking-glass. Or it would be such as to remove some obstructive impurity in the mind of the knowing person; of this kind is the action of calmness and self-restraint with reference to scrip- ture which is the means of apprehending the highest reality. Moreover, even if it were admitted that consciousness may be an object of consciousness, it could not be maintained that the ‘I’ assists the means whereby that consciousness is effected. For if it did so, it could only be in the way of removing any obstacles impeding the origination of such consciousness; analogous to the way in which a lamp assists the eye by dispelling the darkness which impedes the origination of the apprehension of colour. But in the case under discussion we are unable to imagine such obstacles. There is nothing pertaining to consciousness which obstructs the origination of the knowledge of con-

[48] F

VEDANTA-SÜTRAS.

sciousness and which could be removed by the ahamkara.— There is something, you will perhaps reply, viz. Nescience! Not so, we reply.- That Nescience is removed by the ahaz;kára cannot be admitted; knowledge alone can put an end to Nescience.. Nor can consciousness be the abode of Nescience, because in that case Nescience would haye the same abode and the same object as knowledge.: l

In pure knowledge where there is no knowing subject and no object of knowledge—the so-called ‘witnessing principle (sékshin)—Nescience cannot exist. Jars and similar things cannot be the abode of Nescience because there is no possibility of their being the abode of know- ledge, and for the same reason pure knowledge also cannot be the abode of Nescience. And even if consciousness were admitted to be the abode of Nescience, it could not be the object of knowledge; for consciousness being viewed as the Self cannot be the object of knowledge, and hence knowledge cannot terminate the Nescience abiding within consciousness. For knowledge puts an end to Nescience only with regard to its own objects, as in the case of the snake-rope. And the consequence of this would be that the Nescience attached to consciousness - could never be destroyed by any one.—If Nescience, we further remark, is viewed as that which can be defined neither as Being nor non-Being, we shall show later on that such -Nescience is something quite incomprehensible.—On the other hand, Nescience, if understood to be the antecedent non-existence of knowledge, is not opposed in nature to the origination of knowledge, and hence the dispelling of Nescience cannot be viewed as promoting the means of the knowledge of the Self—From all this it follows that the ahaz/':ára cannot effect in any way ‘manifestation of consciousness,’

Nor (to finish up this point) can it be said that it is the essential nature of manifesting agents to manifest things in so far as the latter have their abode in the former; for such a relation is not observed in the case of lamps and the

like (which manifest what lies Outside them). The essen-

I ADHYAYA, I PÁDA, I. 67

tial nature of manifesting agents rather lies therein that they promote the knowledge of things as they really are, and this is also the nature of whatever promotes knowledge and the means thereof. Nor is it even true that the mirror manifests the face. The mirror is only the-cause of a certain irregularity, viz. the reversion of the ocular rays of light, and to this irregularity there is due the appearance of the face within the mirror; but the manifesting agent is the light only. And it is evident that the ahazzkára is not capable of producing an irregularity (analogous to that produced by the mirror) in consciousness which is self- luminous.—And—with regard to the second analogous instance alleged by you—the fact is that the species is known through the individual because the latter is its substrate (as expressed in the general principle, ‘the species is the form of the individual") but not because the indi- vidual ‘manifests’ the species. Thus there is no reason, either real or springing from some imperfection, why the consciousness of consciousness should be brought about by its abiding in the ahaz/kára, and the attribute of being the knowing agent or the consciousness of that cannot therefore belong to the ahaz;kára.' Hence, what constitutes the inward Self is not pure consciousness but the ‘I’ which proves itself as the knowing subject. In the absence of egoity, *inwardness' could not be established for con-

Sciousness.

The conscious subject persists in deep sleep.

We now come to the question as to the nature of deep sleep. In deep sleep the quality of darkness prevails in the mind and there is no conseiousness of outward things, and thus there is no distinct and clear presentation of the ‘I’; but all the same the Self somehow presents itself up to the time of waking in the one form of the ‘I,’ and the latter cannot therefore be said to be absent. “Pure con- sciousness assumed by you (to manifest itself in deep sleep) is really in no better case ; fora person risen from deep sleep never represents to himself his state of consciousness during

F2

68 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

sleep in the form, ‘I was pure consciousness free from all egoity and opposed in nature to everything else, witnessing Nescience’; what he thinks is only ‘I slept well. From this form of reflection it appears that even during sleep the Self, i. e. the ‘I,’ was a knowing subject and perceptive of pleasure. Nor must you urge against this that the reflec- tion has the following form: * As now I feel pleasure, so I slept then also’; for the reflection is distinctly zo of that kind’, Nor must you say that owing to the non-perma- nency of the *I' its perception of pleasure during sleep cannot connect itself with the waking state. For (the ‘I’ is permanent as appears from the fact that) the person who has risen from sleep recalls things of which he was conscious before his sleep, ‘I did such and such a thing, * I observed this or that,’ ‘I said so or so.—But, you will perhaps say, he also reflects, * For such and such a time I was con- scious of nothing !'—' And what does this imply?’ we ask. — It implies a negation of everything !’—By no means, we rejoin. The words ‘I was conscious’ show^that the know- ing ‘I’ persisted, and that hence what is negated is only the objects of knowledge. If the negation implied in ‘ of nothing’ included everything, it would also negative the Pure consciousness which you hold to persist in deep sleep. In the judgment ‘I was conscious of nothing,’ the word ‘I? clearly refers to the * I” i.e. the knowing Self which persists even during deep sleep, while the words ‘ was con- scious of nothing’ negative all knowledge on the part of tatio elif now, in the face of this, you undertake to prove by means of this very judgment that knowledge— which is expressly defiied— existed at the time, and that the per- sisting knowing Self did. not exist, you may address your proof to the patient gods who give no reply !—But— our opponent goes on to urge—I form the follow

! T. e. the reflection as to

the perception of pleasure refers past state of sleep only, p to the

not to the present moment of reflection,

I ADHYAYA, I PADA; I. 69

sistence of the ‘I’ flatly contradicts the state of conscious- ness expressed in the judgment ‘I was not conscious of myself’ and the verbal form of the judgment itself !—But what then is denied by the words ‘of myself’ ?—This, we admit, is a reasonable question. Let us consider the point. What is negatived in that judgment is not the knowing ‘I’ itself, but merely the distinctions of caste, condition of life, &c. which belong to the ‘I’ at the time of waking. We must distinguish the objects of the several parts of the judgment under discussion. The object of the ‘(me) myself’ is the ‘I’ distinguished by class characteris- tics as it presents itself in the waking state; the object of the word ‘I’ (in the judgment) is that ‘I’ which consists of a uniform flow of self-consciousness which persists in sleep also, but is then not quite distinct. The judgment * I did not know myself’ therefore means that the sleeper was not conscious of the place where he slept, of his special charac- teristics, and so on.—It is, moreover, your own view that in deep sleep the Self occupies the position of a witnessing principle with regard to Nescience. But by a witness (sákshin) we understand some one who knows about some- thing by personal observation (sákshát); a person who does not know cannot be a witness. Accordingly, in scripture as wellas in ordinary language a knowing subject only, not mere knowledge, is spoken of as a witness; and with this the Reverend Pázini also agrees when teaching that the word (sákshin' means one who knows in person (Pa. Sa. V, 2,91). Now this witness is nothing else but the ‘I’ which is apprehended in the judgment ‘I know’; and how then should this ‘I’ not be apprehended in the state of sleep? That which itself appears to the Self appears as the ‘I,’ and it thus follows that also in deep sleep and similar states, the Self which then shines forth appears

as the ‘I.’

The conscious subject persists in the state of release.

To maintain that the consciousness of the ‘I’ does not persist in the state of final release is again altogether inap-

70 VEDÁNTA-SÜTRAS.

pressed in somewhat different words—that final release is the annihilation of the Self. - The ‘I? is not a mere attri- bute of the Self so that even after its destruction the essen- tial nature of the Self might persist—as it persists on the cessation of ignorance; but it constitutes the very nature of the Self Such judgments as ‘I know; ‘ Knowledge has arisen in me,’ show, on the other hand, that we are con- scious of knowledge as a mere attribute of the Self.— Moreover, a man who suffering pain, mental or of other kind—whether such pain be real or due to error only —puts himself in relation to pain—'I am suffering pain '— naturally begins to reflect how he may once for all free himself from all these manifold afflictions and enjoy a state of untroubled ease ; the desire of final release thus having arisen in him he at once sets to work to accomplish it, If, On the other hand, he were to realise that the effect of such activity would be the loss of personal existence, he surely would turn away as soon as somebody began to tell him about ‘release,’ And the result of this would be that, in the absence of willing and qualified pupils, the whole scrip- tural teaching as to final release would lose its authorita- tive character.—Nor Must you maintain against this that

ness; for this by no means improves your case. No sensible person exerts himself under the influence of the idea that after he himself has perished there wil] remain some entity termed < pure light !’_What constitutes the ‘inward’ Self thus is the ‘I,’ the knowing subject.

This ‘inward’ Self shines forth in the state of final release also as an ‘I’; for it appears to itself. The general principle ds that whatever being appears to itself appears as an ‘ "8 both parties in the present *lispute establish the existence of the transmigrating Self on such appearance. On the contrary, whatever does not appear as an ‘J,’ does not appear to itself ; aS Jars and the like. Now the emanci- Pated Self does thus appear to itself, and therefore it appears gano Le Nor docs this appearance as an ‘Į’ imply in any way that the released Self js Subject to

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 71 Ss Nescience and implicated in the Samsara; for this would contradict the nature of final release, and moreover the consciousness of the ‘I’ cannot be the cause of Nescience and so on. Nescience (ignorance) is either ignorance as to essential. nature, or the cognition of something under an aspect different from the real one (as when a person suffer- ing from jaundice sees all things yellow); or cognition of what is altogether opposite in nature (as when mother o pearl is mistaken for silver). Now the *I' constitutes the essential nature of the Self; how then can the conscious- ness of the ‘I,’ i. e. the consciousness of its own true nature, implicate the released Self in Nescience, or, in the Samsara ? The fact rather is that such consciousness destroys Nes- cience, and so on, because it is essentially opposed to them. In agreement with this we observe that persons like the rishi Vámadeva, in whom thé intuition of their identity with Brahman had totally destroyed all Nescience, en- joyed the consciousness of the personal ‘I’; for scripture says, ‘Seeing this the rishi Vámadeva understood, / was Manu and the Sun’ (Bri. Up. I, 4, 19). And the highest Brahman also, which is opposed to all other forms of Nescience and denoted and conceived as pure Being, is spoken of in an analogous way ; CP. ' Let me make each of these three deities,’ &c. (X4. Up. VI, 3; 3); ‘May I bemany, ‘may I grow forth’ (X4. Up. VI, 2, 3); * He thought, shall I send forth worlds?’ (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 1, 1); and again, ' Since I transcend the Destructible, and am higher also than the Indestructible, therefore I am proclaimed in the world and in the Veda as the highest Person’ (Bha. Gi. XV, 18) ; ‘Tam the Self, O Gidakesa’ (Bha. Gi. X, 20); * Never was T not’ (Bha. Gi. II, 12); ‘Iam the source and the destruc- tion of the whole world’ (Bha. Gi. WAL, ye VIE eim the source of all; from me proeeeds everything’ (Bha. Gi. X, 8); ‘I am he who raises them from the ocean of the world of death’ (Bha. Gi. XII, 7); ‘I am the giver of seed, the ‘father ’.(Bha. Gi. XIV, 4); I know the things past' (Bha. Gi. VII, 26).—But if the ‘I ' (aham) constitutes the essen- tial nature of the Self, how is it that the Holy One teaches the principle of egoity (ahawkara) to belong to the sphere

72 VEDÁNTA-SÜTRAS., of objects, "The great donent, he shui, th under- standing (buddhi), and the Unevolved ' (Bha. Gt. XIII, 5)? —As in all passages, we reply, which give information about the true nature of the Self it is Spoken of as the ‘I,’ we con- clude that the ‘I’ constitutes the essential nature of the in- ward Self. Where, on the other hand, the Holy One declares the ahaz;ikára—a special effect of the Unevolved—to be comprised within the sphere of the Objective, he means that principle which is called ahazikára, because it causes .the assumption of Egoity on the part of the body which belongs to the Not-self. Such egoity constitutes the ahaz- kára also designated as pride or arrogance, which Causes men to slight persons superior to themselves, and is referred to by scripture in many places as something evil. Such consciousness of the ‘T’ therefore as is not sublated by anything else has the Self for its object; while, on the other hand, such consciousness of the ‘I’ as has the body for its object is mere Nescience. In agreement with this the Reverend Parásara has said, * Hear from me the essen- tial nature of Nescience; it is the attribution of Selfhood to What is not the Self If the Self were pure consciousness then pure. consciousness only, and not the quality of being a knowing Subject, would present itself in the body also, which is a Not-self wrongly imagined to be a Self. The Conclusion therefore remains that the Self js nothing but the knowing ‘I, Thus it has been Said, * As is proved by perception, and as also results from reasoning and tradition, and from its connexion with ignorance, the Self presents itself as a knowing ‘I? And again, ‘That which is different from body, Senses, mind, and" vita] airs; which does not depend on other means; which “js Permanent, pervading, divided accordingeto bodies tho js the Self blessed in ISI DETTO ‘not dependent On other means’ means “self-luminous’ ; and ‘ pervading ’ means ‘being of such à nature as to enter, owing to excessive minuteness, into all non-sentient things.’

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 73

in cases of Scripture conflicting with Perception, Scrip- ture is not stronger. The True cannot be known through the Untrue.

With reference to the assertion (p. 24 ff.) that Perception, which depends on the view of plurality, is based on some defect and hence admits of being otherwise accounted for —whence it follows that it is sublated by Scripture; we ask you to point out what defect it is on which Perception is based and may hence be accounted for otherwise.— The beginningless imagination of difference" we expect you to reply.—But, we ask in return, have you then come to know by some other means that this beginningless imagination of difference, acting in a manner analogous to that of certain defects of vision, is really the cause of an altogether perverse view of things ?—If you reply that this is known just from the fact that Perception is in conflict with Scripture, we point out that. you are reasoning in a circle: you prove the defectiveness of the imagination of plurality through the fact that Scripture tells us about a substance devoid of all difference ; and at the same time you prove the latter point through the former. Moreover, if Perception gives rise to perverse cognition because it is based on the imagination of plurality, Scripture also is in no better case—for ii is based on the very same view.—If against this you urge that Scripture, although based on a.defect, yet sublates Perception in so far as it is the cause of a cognition which dispels all plurality apprehended through Perception, and thus is later in order than Perception; we rejoin that the defectiveness of the foundation of Scripture having once been recognised, the circumstance of its being later is of no avail. For if .a man is afraid of a rope which he mistakes for a snake his fear does not come to an end because another man, whom he considers to be in error himself, tells him * This is no snake, do not be afraid.’ And that Scripture Zs founded on something defective is known at the very time of hearing Scripture, for the reflection (which follows on hearing) con- sists in repeated attempts to cognise the oneness of Brahman —a cognition which is destructive of all the plurality appre-

74. VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

hended through the first hearing of the Veda.—We further ask, ‘By what means do you arrive at the conclusion that Scripture cannot possibly be assumed to be defective in any way, while defects may be ascribed to Perception’? It is certainly not Consciousness—self-proved and absolutely devoid of all difference—which enlightens you on this point; for such Consciousness is unrelated to any objects whatever, and incapable of partiality to Scripture. Nor can sense-- perception be the source of your conviction; for as it is founded on what is defective it gives perverse information. Nor again the other sources of knowledge ; for they aré all based on sense-perception. As thus there are no acknow- ledged means of knowledge to prove your view, you must give it up.—But, you will perhaps say, we proceed by means ofthe ordinary empirical means and objects of knowledge!— What, we ask in reply, do you understand by ‘empirical’ ? —What rests on immediate unreflective knowledge, but is found not to hold good when tested by logical reasoning !— But what is the use, we ask, of knowledge of this kind? If logical reasoning refutes something known through some means of knowledge, that means of knowledge is no longer authoritative I—Now you will possibly argue as follows : 'Scripture as well as Perception is founded on N escience ; but all the same Perception is sublated by Scripture.. For as the object of Scripture, i.e. Brahman, which is one and without a second, is not seen to be Sublated by any ulterior cognition, Brahman, i.e. pure non-differenced Consciousness, remains as the sole Reality.'— But here too you are wrong, since we must decide that something which rests on a defect Is unreal, although it may remain unrefuted. We will illus- trate this point by an analogous instance. ' Let us imagine a race of men afflicted with a certain Special defect of vision, without being aware of this their defect, dwelling in. some remote mountain caves inaccessible to all other men pro-

will equally see and judge bri T , ge bright things, e.g. the moon, to be double. Now in the case of these people there never arises a subsequent cognition sublating their primitive

I ADHYAYA, I PÁDA, I. 75

cognition; but the latter is false all the same, and its object, viz. the doubleness of the moon, is false likewise ; the defect of vision being the cause of a cognition not corresponding to reality.—And so it is with the cognition of Brahman also. This cognition is based on Nescience, and therefore is false, together with'its object, viz. Brahman, although no sublating cognition presents itself.— This conclusion admits of various expressions in logical form. ‘The Brahman under dispute is false because it is the object of knowledge which has sprung from what is affected with Nescience; as the phe- nomenal world is.’ ‘Brahman is false because it is the object of knowledge; as the world is? * Brahman is false because it is the object of knowledge, the rise of which has the Untrue for its cause ; as the world is.

You will now perhaps set.forth the following analogy. States of dreaming consciousness—such as the perception of elephants and the like in one’s dreams—are unreal, and yet they are the cause of the knowledge of real things, viz. good or ill fortune (portended by those dreams). Hence there is no reason why Scripture—although unreal in so far as based on Nescience—should not likewise be the cause of the cognition of what is real, viz. Brahman.—The two cases are not parallel, we reply. The conscious states ex- perienced in dreams are o£ unreal; it is only their objects that are false ; these objects only, not the conscious states, are sublated by the waking consciousness. Nobody thinks ‘the cognitions of which I was conscious in my dream are unreal'; what men actually think is ' the cognitions are real, but the things are not real! In the same way the illusive state of consciousness which the magician produces in the minds of other men by means of mantras, drugs, &c., is true, and hence the cause of love and fear; for such states of consciousness also are not sublated. The cognition which, owing to some defect in the object, the sense organ, &c., apprehends a rope as a snake is real, and hence the cause of fear and other emotions. True also is the imagination which, owing to the nearness of a snake, arises in the mind of a man though not actually bitten, viz. that he has been bitten; true also is the representation ‘of the imagined

76 VEDÁNTA-SÜTRAS. ———— M O poison, for it may be the cause of actual death. In the same way the reflection of the face in the water is realy and hence enables us to ascertain details belonging to the real face. All these states of consciousness are real, as we conclude from their having a beginning and actual effects.—Nor would it avail you to object that in the absence of real elephants, and so on, the ideas of them cannot be real For ideas require only some substrate in general; the mere appearance of a thing is a sufficient substrate, and such an appearance is present in the case in question, owing to a certain defect. The thing we deter- mine to be unreal because it is sublated; the idea is non- sublated, and therefore real.

Nor can you quote in favour of your view— of the real being known through the unreal ——the instance of the stroke and the letter. The letter being apprehended through the stroke (i.e. the written character) does not furnish a case of the real being apprehended through thé unreal ; for the

letter only in SO far as it is apprehended as being a letter, and this ‘being a letter’ js untrue !—Not so, we rejoin. If this ‘ being a letter? were unreal it could not be a means of the apprehension of the letter; for we neither observe nor

the means !—In that case, We rejoin, the apprehension of

would follow therefrom that the means and what is to be effected thereby would be one, i.e. both would be, without

I ADHYAYA, I PARA, I. 7/7

we reply, but on this explanation the real is known through the real; for both stroke and conventional power of sym- bolisation are real. The case is analogous to that of the idea of a buffalo being caused by the picture of a buffalo ; that idea rests on the similarity of picture and thing depicted, and that similarity is something real. Nor can it be said (with a view to proving the pürvapaksha by another analo- gous instance) that we meet with a cognition of the real by means of the unreal in the case of sound (sabda) which is essentially uniform, but causes the apprehension of different things by means of difference of tone (nada). For sound is the cause of the apprehension of different things in so far only as we apprehend the connexion of sound manifest- ing itself in various tones, with the different things indicated by those various tones!. And, moreover, it is not correct to argue on the ground of the uniformity of sound; for only particular significant sounds such as ‘ga, which can be apprehended by the ear, are. really ‘sound. —All this proves that it is difficult indeed to show that the know- ledge of a true thing, viz. Brahman, can be derived from Scripture, if Scripture—as based on Nescience—is itself untrue.

Our opponent may finally argue as tollows :—Scripture is not unreal in the same sensè as a sky-flower is unreal ; for antecedently to the cognition of universal non-duality Scripture is viewed as something that zs, and only on the rise of that knowledge it is seen to be unreal. At this latter time Scripture no longer is a means of cognising Brahman, devoid of all difference, consisting of pure Intel- ligence; as long on the other hand as it is such a means, Scripture zs; for then we judge ‘Scripture is. —But to this we reply that if Scripture is not (true), the judgment ‘Scripture is’ is false, and hence the knowledge resting on false Scripture being false likewise, the object of that know- ledge, i.c. Brahman itself, is false. If the cognition of fire which rests on mist being mistaken for smoke is false, it: IA. Ras co rz poeticam eM MM E MM

1 And those manifestations of sound by means of various tones are themselves something real.

78 VEDÁNTA-SÜTRAS. :

follows that the object of that cognition, viz. fire itself, is likewise unreal. Nor can it be shown that (in the case of Brahman) there is no possibility of ulterior sublative cognition ; for there may be such sublative cognition, viz. the one expressed in the judgment ‘the Reality is a Void.’ And if you say that this latter judgment rests on error, we point out that according to yourself the knowledge of Brahman is also based on error. And of our judgment ' (viz. ‘the Reality is a Void ) it may truly be said that all further negation is impossible.—But there is no need to continue this demolition of an altogether baseless theory.

No scriptural texts teach & Brahman devoid of &ll difference.

We now turn to the assertion that certain Scriptural texts, as e.g. ‘Being only was this in the beginning,’ are meant to teach that there truly exists only one homo- geneous substance, viz. Intelligence free from all difference.— This we cannot allow. For the section in which the quoted text occurs, in order to make good the initial declaration that by the knowledge of one thing all things are known, shows that the highest Brahman which is denoted by the term ‘Being’ is the substantia] and also the operative

proceeds to instruct Svetaketu: that this Brahman consti- tutes his Self also (‘Thou art that ) We have fully set forth this point in the Vedartha-samgraha, and shall estab-

lish it in greater detail in the Present work also, in the so-called árambhaza-adhikaraza — In the same w

es § eternity, all-per- vadingness, Subtilty, omnipresence, omniscience, imperish.

*

2 E.

| "i u * 1

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I 79

ableness, creativeness with regard to all beings, and other auspicious qualities. Now we maintain that also the text ‘True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman, does not prove a substance devoid of all difference, for the reason that the co-ordination of the terms of which it consists explains itself in so far only as denoting one thing distinguished by several attributes. For ‘co-ordination’ (s&ámánádhikarazya, lit. the abiding of several things in a common substrate’) means the reference (of several terms) to one thing, there being a difference of reason for the application (of several terms to one thing) Now whether we take the several terms, ‘ True,’ ‘ Knowledge,’ ‘ Infinite,’ in their primary sense, i.e. as denoting qualities, or as denoting modes of being opposed to whatever is contrary to those qualities; in either case we must needs admit a plurality of causes for the application of those sevcral terms to one thing. There is however that difference between the two alternatives that in the former case the terms preserve their primary mean- ing, while in the latter case their denotative power depends on so-called ‘implication’ (lakshazá) Nor can it be said that the opposition in nature to non-knowledge, &c. (which is the purport of the terms on the hypothesis of lakshazá), constitutes nothing more than the essential nature (of one non-differenced substance; the three terms thus having one purport only); for as such essential nature would be sufficiently apprehended through one term, the employ- ment of further terms would be purposeless. This view would moreover be in conflict with co-ordination, as it would not allow of difference of motive for several terms applied to one thing. On the other hand it cannot be urged against the former alternative that the distinction of several attributes predicated of one thing implies a dis- tinction in the thing to which the attributes belong, and that from this it follows that the several terms denote several things—a result which also could not be recon- ciled with ‘co-ordination’; for what ‘co-ordination’ aims at is just to convey the idea of one thing being qualified by several attributes. For the grammarians define * co- ordination ' as the application, to one thing, of several words.

80 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

== ÁO

for the application of each of which there is a different motive.

You have turther maintained the following view :—In the text ‘one only without a second,’ the phrase ‘ without a second ' negatives all duality on Brahman's part even in so far as qualities are concerned. We must therefore, accord- ing to the principle that all .SAkhás convey the same doc- trine, assume that all texts which speak of Brahman as cause, aim at setting forth an absolutely non-dual sub- stance. Of Brahman thus indirectly defined as a cause, the text ‘The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman,’ contains a direct definition; the Brahman here meant to be defined must thus be devoid of all qualities. Otherwise, moreover, the text would be in conflict with those other texts which declare Brahman to be without qualities and blemish.—But this also cannot be admitted. What the phrase ‘without-a second ' really aims at intimating is that Brahman possesses manifold powers, and this it does by denying the existence of another ruling principle different from Brahman. That Brahman actually Possesses manifold powers the text shows further on, ‘It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth,’ and ‘it sent forth fire, and so on.—But how are we to know that the mere phrase ‘ without a second’ is meant to negative the existence of al] other 'causes in general ?—Ag follows, we reply. The clause ‘Being only this was in the beginning, one only,’ teaches that Brahman when about to

hence we understand that the added clause ‘without a Second' is meant to negative such an additional cause, If it Were meant absolutely to deny all duality, it would deny also the eternity and other attributes of Brahman which you yourself assume, You in this case make just the

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. 81

text ‘True, knowledge,’ &c., teaches Brahman to possess attributes; for this passage has to be interpreted in agree- ment with the texts referring to Brahman as a cause. Nor does this imply a conflict with the texts which deciare Brahman to be without qualities; for tnose texts are meant to negative the evil qualities depending on Prakriti. —Those texts again which refer to mere knowledge declare indeed that knowledge is the essentiai nature of Brahman, but this does not mean that mere knowledge constitutes. the fundamental reality. For knowledge constitutes the essential nature of a knowing subject only whict is the substrate of knowledge, in the same way as the sun, lamps, and gems are the substrate of Light. That. Brahmar is a knowing subject all scriptural texts declare: cp. He who is all knowing’ (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9); ‘It thought’ (Kz, Up. VI, 2, 3); ‘This divine being thought’ (KA. Up. VI, 3, 2); ‘He thought, let me send forth tne worlds’ (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 1, 2); ‘He who arranges the wishes—as eternal of those who are not eternal, as thinker of (other) thinkers, as one of many’ (Ka. Up. II, 5, 13); ‘There are-two unborn ones—one who knows, one who does not know— one strong, the other weak’ (Svet. Up. I, 9) ; * Let us know Him, the highest of Lords, the great Lord, the highest deity of deities, the master of masters, the highest above the god, the lord of the world, the adorable anes (Svet. Up. VI, 7); * Of him there is known no effect (body) ór instru- ment; no one is seen like unto him or better; his high power is revealed as manifold, forming his essential nature, as knowledge, strength, and action’ (Svet. Up. VI, 8); ‘That is the Self, free from sin, ageless, deathless griefless, free from hunger and thirst, whose wishes are true, whose purposes are true’ (KZ. Up. VIII, 1, 5). "These and other texts declare that to Brahman, whose essential nature is knowledge, there belong many excellent qualities—among which that of being a knowing subject stands first, and that Brahman is free from all evil qualities. That the texts referring to Brahman as free from qualities, and those | which speak of it as possessing qualities, háve really one and the same object may be inferred from the last of the [48] G

82 VEDÁNTA-SÜTRAS.

passages quoted above; the earlier part of which—-' free from sin,’ up to ‘free from thirst'—denies of Brahman all evil-qualities, while its latter part—‘ whose wishes are true,’ and so on—asserts of its certain excellent qualities. As thus there is no contradiction between the two classes of texts, fhere is no reason whatever to assume that either of them- has for its object something that is false.—— With - regard to the concluding passage of the Taittiriya-text, 'from whence all speech, together with the mind, turns away, unable to reach it ^^ we point out that with the passage ‘From terror of it the wind blows, there begins a declaration of the qualities of Brahman, and that the next section ‘one hundred times that human bliss,’ &c., makes statements as to the relative bliss enjoyed by the different classes of embodied souls; the concluding passage ‘He who knows the bliss of that Brahman from whence all speech, together with the mind, turns away unable to reach it, hence must be taken as proclaiming with emphasis the infinite nature of Brahman's auspicious qualities. More- over, a clause in the chapter under discussion—-viz. ‘he obtains all desires, together with Brahman the all-wise’ (II, 1)—which gives information as to the fruit of the know- ledge of Brahman clearly declares the infinite nature of the qualities of the highest all-wise Brahman. The desires are the auspicious qualities of Brahman which are the objects of desire ; the man who knows Brahman obtains, together with Brahman, all qualities of it, The expression ‘ together with’ is meant to bring out the primary importance of the qualities; as also described in the so-called dahara-vidya (KA. Up. VIII, 1). And that fruit and meditation are of the same character (i.e. that in meditations on Brahman its qualities are the chief matter of meditation, just as these qualities are the principa? point in Brahman reached by the Devotee) is proved by the text ‘According to what a mans thought is in this world, so will he be after he has

' Which passage appears to refer to a nirguza brahman, whence

it might be inferred that the Connected initial passage — Satyam granam, &c.—has a similar-purport.

I ADHYÁYA, I PADA, I. 83

departed this life' (Kh. Up- IN TS I). If it be said that the passage ‘By whom it is not thought by him it is thought, ‘not understood by those who understand’ (Ke. Up. 11, 3), declares Brahman not to be an object of know- ledge; we deny this, because were it so, certain other texts would not teach that final Release. results from knowledge ; cp. ‘He who knows Brahman obtains the Highest’ (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1); ‘He knows Brahman, he becomes Brahman.’ And, moreover, the text ‘ He who knows Brahman as non-existing becomes himself non- existing; he who knows Brahman as existing, him we know himself as existing’ (Taitt. Up. II, 6, 1), makes the existence and non-existence of the Self dependent on the existence and non-existence of knowledge which has Brah- man for its object. We thus conclude that all scriptural texts enjoin just the knowledge of Brahman for the sake of final Release. This knowledge is, as we already know, of the nature of meditation, and what is to be meditated on is Brahman as possessing qualities. (The text from the Ke. Up. then explains itself as follows:—) We are informed by the passage ‘from whence speech together with mind turns away, being unable to reach it,’ that the infinite Brahman with its unlimited excellences cannot be | defined either by mind or speech as being so or so much, and from this we conclude the Kena text to mean that Brahman is not thought and not understood by those who understand it to be of a definitely limited nature; Brahman. in truth being unlimited. If the text did not mean this, it would be self-contradictory, parts of it saying that Brah- man is zo¢ thought and ze? understood, and other parts, that it zs thought and zs understood.

Now as regards the assertion that the text ‘Thou mayest not see the seer of seeing; thou mayest not think the thinker of thinking’ (Bzz. Up: III, 5, 2), denies the exis- tence of a seeing and thinking subject different from mere secing and thinking.—This view is refuted by the following interpretation. The text addresses itself to a person who has formed the erroneous opinion that the quality of con- sciousness or knowledge does not constitute the essential

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84 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

nature of the knower, but belongs to it only as an adventi- tious attribute, and telis him ‘Do not view or think the Self to be such, but consider the seeing and thinking Self to have seeing and thinking for its essential nature.’ — Or else this text may mean that the embodied Self which is the seer of seeing and the thinker of thinking should be set aside, and that only the highest Self—the inaer Self of all beings— should be meditated upon.—Othérwise a conflict would arise with texts declaring the knowership of the Self, such as ‘whereby should he know the knower ?' (Bzz. Up. IV, 5, 15).

_ Your assertion that the text ‘Bliss is Brahman’ (Taitt. Up. III, 6, 1) proves pure Bliss to constitute the essential nature of Brahman is already disposed of by the refutation of the view that knowledge (consciousness) constitutes the essential nature of Brahman; Brahman being in reality the substrate only of knowledge. For by bliss we under- stand a pleasing state of consciousness. Such passages as ‘ consciousness,:bliss. is Brahman,’ therefore mean ‘con- Sciousness—the essential character of which is bliss—is Brahman.’ On this identity of the two things there rests that homogeneous character of Brahman, so much insisted upon by yourself. And in the same Way as numerous passages teach that Brahman; while having knowledge for its essential nature, is at the same time a knowing subject ; so other passages, speaking of Brahman as something separate from mere bliss, show it to be not mere bliss but a subject enjoying bliss ; cp. ‘That is one bliss of Brahman' (Tartt. Up. II, 8, 4); ‘he knowing the bliss of Brahman’ Craan o i o h O e a subject enjoying bliss is in fact the same as to be a conscious subject.

We now turn to the numerous texts which, according to tue view of our opponent, negative the existence of plurality. NH Where there is duality, as it were’ (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15);

There is not any plurality here; from death to death goes me P S d gone has become all, by what means, what all dicus text à se (S7 Up: IV, 5 19) Sema tradicting that a ES Prurality HY COVER ES) Cole

| ity of the world which depends on its

I ADHYAYA, 1 PADA, I. . $5

being in its entirety an effect of Brahman, and having Brahman for its inward ruling principle and its true Self. They do not, on the other hand, deny that plurality on Brahman's part which depends on its intention to become manifold—a plurality proved by the text * May I be many, may I grow forth’ (KZ. Up. VI, 2, 3). Nor can our op- ponent urge against this that, owing to the denial of plurality contained in other passages this last text refers to something not real; for it is an. altogether laughable assertion that Scripture should at first teach the doctrine, difficult to comprehend, that plurality as suggested by Perception and the other means of Knowledge belongs to Brahman also, and should afterwards negative this very doctrine!

Nor is it true that the text * If he makes but the smallest “antaram” (i.e. difference, interval, break) in it there is fear for him” (Taitt. Up. II, 7) implies that he who sees plurality within Brahman encounters fear. For the other text ‘All this is Brahman; let a man meditate with calm mind on all this. as beginning, ending and breathing in it, i.e. Brahman’ (K4. Up. III, 14, 1) teaches directly that reflection on the plurality of Brahman is the cause of peace of mind. For this passage declares that peace of mind is produced by a reflection on the entire world as springing from, abiding within, and being absorbed into Brahman, and thus having Brahman for its Self; and as thus the view of Brahman constituting the Self of the world with all its manifold distinctions of gods, men, animals, inanimate matter and so on, is:said to be the cause of peace of mind, and, consequently, of absence of fear, that same view surely cannot be a cause of fear!—But how then is it that the Taitt. text declares that ‘there is fear for him ' ?— That text, we reply, declares in its earlier part that rest in Brahman is the cause of fearlessness (‘when he finds freedom from fear, rest, in that which is invisible, incorporeal, undefined, unsupported; then he has obtained fearlessness’); its latter part therefore means that fear takes place when there is an interval, a break, in this resting in Brahman. As the great Rishi says ‘When Vasudeva is not meditated on for

86 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

an hour or even a moment only; that is loss, that is great calamity, that is error, that is change.’

The Sátra III, 2, 11 does not, as our opponent alleges, refer to a Brahman free from all difference, but to Brahman as possessing attributes—as we shall show in its place. And the Sûtra